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DUE PROCESS IN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: NORMATIVE AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO*, THOMAS FETZER†, SHAN JIANG‡, AND
YONG HUANG§
Due process in antitrust enforcement has significant implications for
better professional and accurate enforcement decisions. Not only can due
process spur economic growth, raise government credibility, and limit the
abuse of powers according to law; it can also promote competitive reforms
in monopolized sectors and curb corruption. Jurisdictions learn from the
best practices in the investigation process, decision-making process, and the
announcement and judicial review of antitrust enforcement decisions. By
comparing the enforcement policies of China, the European Union, and the
United States, this Article calls for better disclosure of evidence,
participation of legal counsel, and protection of the procedural and
substantive rights of the respondent in the investigation process. In
conducting evidence review and arriving at punitive decisions, the
enforcement agency should establish a separation between investigatory and
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adjudicatory functions. Finally, the issued punishment decision should
contain more comprehensive information and be subject to judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
A global consensus has emerged recognizing the central role that
competition law plays in promoting a nation’s prosperity. As the briefing
notes on trade and competition policy for the 2003 Cancún World Trade
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Organization (“WTO”) Ministerial acknowledged, there is a “growing
realization that mutually supportive trade and competition policies can
contribute to sound economic development, and that effective competition
policies help to ensure that the benefits of liberalization and market-based
reforms flow through to all citizens.”1 Although competition law was
eventually deleted from the agenda of the Doha Round of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) negotiations, having an effective
competition law regime has become a de facto prerequisite for joining the
WTO.2 The number of competition law enforcement agencies has continued
to grow, with the membership of the global group of competition law
authorities known as the International Competition Network (“ICN”) now
including more than 130 countries.3
Adherence to basic principles of due process has long been recognized
as an essential aspect of proper competition law enforcement. The rule of
law is generally understood to include several critical procedural
components, such as “due process, judicial review (by an independent
judiciary), equal application of the law, and transparency” in decisionmaking processes.4 The WTO recognized that clarifying “core principles
including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness”
represented one of the key mandates for its Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy.5
China has also increasingly embraced the importance of due process in
the wake of its accession to the WTO.6 For example, in 2018, the Chinese
Securities Regulatory Commission has also instituted a system of
independent administrative adjudicators to bring Chinese practice in line
with international norms.7
1. Trade and Competition Policy: Dealing with Cartels and Other Anti-Competitive Practices,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (2003), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/b
rief08_e.htm [https://perma.cc/W5LL-ZXCA].
2. H. Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the Draft China Antimonopoly Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 131, 131 (2005).
3. See Members, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/members [https://perma.cc/C253-8V47].
4. Ronald A. Brand, Promoting the Rule of Law: Cooperation and Competition in the EU-US
Relationship, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 163, 164 (2010); accord Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 1329, 1329–30 (David
S. Clark ed., 2007) (concluding that the rule of law includes two primary elements: due process and
judicial review).
5.
Trade and Competition Policy: Dealing with Cartels and Other Anti-Competitive Practices,
supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political
Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 319, 345–47, 351–63 (2004).
7. Chao Xi & Xuanming Pan, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: A Case of Convergence?,
in CHINESE LEGAL REFORM AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION 81, 96–102 (Yun
Zhao & Michael Ng eds., 2017).
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Recent judicial decisions have further underscored the importance of
fair procedures and adequate judicial review. The Chinese Hainan District
Court, for instance, recently reversed an Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”)
decision by the local Development and Reform Commission (“DRC”).
Although the Hainan High Court later reversed the district court’s decision,8
it further resulted in a retrial by the Supreme People’s Court. It was an
important sign that decisions by enforcement agencies cannot avoid judicial
review. Likewise, on September 6, 2017, the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) sent a competition law case against Intel Corp. back to the General
Court with instructions to examine all the arguments put forward by Intel.9
Additionally, the ECJ agreed with the ombudsman’s conclusion that
enforcement authorities must maintain full records of both formal and
informal meetings with competitors and held that the European Commission
had erred in merely providing a nonconfidential summary of an interview to
Intel, although the court concluded error did not influence the decision.10
This rare rebuke pushed the Commission to adhere more carefully to the
procedural rules protecting due process. Both judicial decisions underscore
the importance of reasoned decisionmaking, internal controls, and
transparency associated with fair enforcement procedures.
The past year has borne witness to an upsurge of interest in due process
in the competition law community. For example, at its most recent annual
meeting, the ICN adopted its Recommended Practices on Investigative
Process, which represents the most authoritative type of document the ICN
typically adopts,11 and sixty-two agencies became inaugural signatories of
the ICN’s new Framework for Competition Agency Procedures (“CAP”).12
8. Hainan Sheng Wujia Ju Yu Hainan Yutai Keji Silao Youxian Gongsi Xingzheng Chufa Ershen
Xingzheng Panjueshu (海南省物价局与海南裕泰科技饲料有限公司行政处罚二审行政判决书)
[Hainan Provincial Price Bureau v. Hainan Yutai Sci. & Tech. Feed Co., Ltd., Admin. Penalty SecondInstance Admin. Judgment], Hainan Provincial Higher People’s Ct. Case No. 1180, Jan. 29, 2018 (China).
9. See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 129–143 (Sept. 6,
2017), curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194082&doclang=en.
10. See id. ¶¶ 83–107.
11. See generally INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2019), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads
/2019/05/RPs-Investigative-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEE4-KJ6B].
12. See generally INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FRAMEWORK ON COMPETITION AGENCY
PROCEDURES (2019), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/I
CNCAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD3W-5EMZ]. The adoption of the Recommended Practice represented
the culmination of years of work by the Agency Effectiveness Working Group. See, e.g., INT’L
COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT (2018) [hereinafter ICN GUIDING PRINCIPLES], https://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AEWG_GuidingPrinciples_ProFairness.pdf [https
://perma.cc/94WA-S5H8]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE ON
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2018) [hereinafter ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE], https://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AEWG_GuidanceAnnotated_Investigative
Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT3G-W6GH]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN GUIDANCE ON
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In addition, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) extended its prior work on procedural fairness and transparency13
by conducting additional roundtables on the topic.14 It also began
consideration of a Draft Recommendation of the Council on Transparency
and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law, which lays out principles that
could serve as benchmark for due process in antitrust enforcement.15 As a
follow up to its best practices issued in 2015,16 the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) Antitrust Section’s International Task Force conducted an
assessment of the extent to which different agencies were complying with
them.17 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)18 and the
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”)19 have offered similar
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2014) [hereinafter ICN GUIDANCE], https://www.internationalcompetitionnet
work.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AEWG_Guidance_InvestigativeProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XR8V-JEA3]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION AGENCY
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS ROUNDTABLE REPORT (2014) [hereinafter ICN ROUNDTABLE REPORT],
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AEWG_Roundtable
ReportInvestigativeProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/59T2-MUJR]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN
AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, COMPETITION AGENCY
CONFIDENTIALITY PRACTICES (2014) [hereinafter ICN CONFIDENTIALITY PRACTICES], https://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AEWG_ReportConfidentiality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZZG-8UU6]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT
ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, COMPETITION AGENCY TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES (2013) [hereinafter
ICN TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES], https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/AEWG_ReportTransparency.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F7J-HPCD].
13. See, e.g., OECD COMPETITION COMM., PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY: KEY
POINTS (2012) [hereinafter OECD KEY POINTS], http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50235
955.pdf [https://perma.cc/A254-9RAP]; OECD COMPETITION COMM., POLICY ROUNDTABLES,
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: TRANSPARENCY ISSUES IN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS (2011) [hereinafter OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT], https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition
/48825133.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8B2-K38S].
14. OECD COMPETITION COMM., ACCESS TO THE CASE FILE AND PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION (2019) [hereinafter OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON ACCESS TO THE CASE FILE],
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3(2019)6/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4MS-RAA3];
OECD COMPETITION COMM., THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY COURTS IN COMPETITION CASES (2019)
[hereinafter OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW], https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP/WP3(2019)1/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALJ-9S2A].
15. OECD COMPETITION COMM., SCOPING NOTE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS AS A LONG-TERM THEME FOR 2019–2020 (2018), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2018)6&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/52W4WGA7].
16. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST L. INT’L TASK FORCE, BEST PRACTICES FOR
ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (May 22, 2015) [hereinafter ABA BEST PRACTICES], https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_bestprac_20150522.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4RJ-AUQP].
17. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., ASSESSMENT OF GLOBAL COMPETITION
AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (Apr. 29, 2019),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/sal-procedural-transparency2019-04-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7Z8-JUXJ].
18. See, e.g., ASS’N OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS, ASEAN REGIONAL GUIDELINES ON COMPETITION
POLICY (2010), https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Compendium/Documents/ASEAN/ASEAN-Region
alGudelinesonCompetitionPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LMX-4AJL].
19. See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., COMM’N ON COMPETITION, RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK
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guidance.
While the existing guidelines and best practices are helpful, they are
pitched at a high level of generality and stop short of detailed application to
national law. This Article strives to fill that void by engaging in a detailed
comparison of procedures employed by competition law officials in China,
the European Union (“EU”), and the United States and making nine
recommendations that would improve due process.
It is now a fitting moment to assess the state of enforcement processes.
China’s AML celebrated its tenth anniversary of implementation in 2018,
and China is currently considering possible revisions. The National People’s
Congress Standing Committee recently revised China’s Administrative
Litigation Law to make it more conducive to economic growth.20 At the same
time, President Xi Jinping led a major anti-corruption campaign designed to
stop government decisions that are motivated by personal or parochial
interests and other abuses of power.21 All are part of broader efforts to
balance the government-market relationship and make enterprises operating
in China more market responsive and efficient.
I. THE BENEFITS OF STRONG PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Before discussing the existing and recommended enforcement
procedures in China, the EU, and the United States, it is worth considering
why jurisdictions should use procedures to limit the discretion of their
enforcers. Although procedural protections can make enforcement more
cumbersome, they yield numerous benefits to the agency and society.
Determining the appropriate level of procedural protections thus requires
striking a careful balance.
A. COMPLIANCE WITH BASIC NORMS OF IMPARTIALITY
The right to be judged by an impartial decisionmaker is a cornerstone
of due process. The well-established imperative that no person should be a
judge in his or her own case is often embodied in the Latin phrase, nemo
judex in re sua, a saying with an ancient history, tracing from the Justinian

FOR INTERNATIONAL

BEST PRACTICES IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2010)
[hereinafter ICC BEST PRACTICES], https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/ICCInternational-Due-process-08-03-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSH9-6GJC].
20. See generally He Haibo, How Much Progress Can Legislation Bring? The 2014 Amendment
of the Administrative Litigation Law of PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 137 (2018).
21. See President Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous
Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 18, 2017)
(vowing to let markets play a “decisive role”).
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Code22 to Lord Coke’s landmark decision in Dr. Bonham’s Case to the
present day.23 The historical justification for this principle is that serving as
a judge in one’s own cause creates an unacceptable appearance of possible
bias, regardless of whether such bias actually exists. The emerging literature
on cognitive psychology provides a stronger analytical and empirical
foundation for this intuition, revealing that even the best-intentioned actors
struggle to maintain their objectivity when forced to play the role of both
advocate and adjudicator.24 Although civil law systems rely on inquisitorial
procedures in courts, in which the judge both leads the questioning and
makes the decision, the safeguards of judicial independence do not apply to
administrative decisionmaking in which the decisionmaker also plays the
role of investigator.25
Administrative agencies are thus especially problematic as they often
combine investigatory and prosecutorial functions with adjudicatory
functions. In the words of Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall,
[I]f the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the governmental body on
the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision will be based
on considerations other than the merits as developed by the evidence. The
government would, in effect, be the judge of its own case.26

European scholars have raised similar concerns in the context of competition
law. Ian Forrester concludes, “The fusion of investigative and decisionmaking functions is incompatible with the notion of ‘an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law’ enshrined in [Article] 6 of the
ECHR.”27 Heike Schweitzer similarly notes, “The Commission, vested both
with investigative and prosecutorial powers, cannot be considered an
impartial, quasi-juridical body if one takes the pervasive risk of a decisional
bias into account.”28
The U.S. Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in its 1950
decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, in which the Court held that asking
“the same men . . . to serve both as prosecutors and as judges . . . weakens
22. CODE JUST. 3.5.1 (Justinian I & Justin II 527/567).
23. Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.).
24. Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of
Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37, 37 (2010).
25. Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Open and Closed Judicial Review of Agency Action: The
Conflicting U.S. and Israeli Approaches, 64 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 521, 550–53 (2016).
26. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986).
27. Ian S. Forrester, Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with
Flawed Procedures, 34 EUR. L. REV. 817, 837 (2009).
28. Heike Schweitzer, Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU
ANTITRUST LAW: ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE 491, 508 n.72 (Damien Geradin & Ioannis Lianos
eds., 2013).
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public confidence” in the fairness of the proceedings.29 “Commission
decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being
rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the commission, in the role
of prosecutor, presented to itself.”30
The concern arises even if every official acts conscientiously and in
good faith. Being a judge in one’s own cause is a structural conflict of
interest that creates the appearance of impropriety even when the person
adjudicating the dispute remains completely objective. The European Court
of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has recognized that the combination of
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions may be cured by plenary judicial
review.31 In that case, the independence of the appellate judge provides the
necessary safeguard against self-dealing.
B. GREATER ACCURACY OF DECISIONS
Although difficult to verify empirically, the conventional wisdom holds
that procedural protections lead to more accurate decisions. Redish and
Marshall conclude that the purpose of due process “is to ensure the most
accurate decision possible . . . . The rights to notice, hearing, counsel,
transcript, and to calling and cross-examining witnesses all relate directly to
the accuracy of the adjudicative process.”32 Redish later observes that
[t]he connecting link between accuracy and due process is the belief that
the adjudicator is more likely to find the facts correctly if the parties
possessing both the strongest interest in the outcome and the greatest
access to the relevant information are provided a meaningful opportunity
to present their cases to the fact finder.33

Harvard Law Professor Richard Stewart draws the same conclusion, noting
that administrative procedures are “designed to promote the accuracy,
rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative
directives.”34 Vanderbilt Law Professor Edward Rubin similarly finds that
“a consensus exists about the purpose of [due process]: to ensure accurate
decision making in government adjudications.”35
29. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 42 (1950) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON
ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37
(1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 43509/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106438.
32. Redish & Marshall, supra note 26, at 476.
33. Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation,
63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 20 (1996).
34. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1670 (1975).
35. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1102
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Modern psychology and the related field of behavioral economics have
identified certain common cognitive heuristics that cause decisionmakers to
reach inaccurate decisions, summarized succinctly by Ian Forrester and
Professor Wouter Wils.36 First, officials tend to identify with the agencies in
which they serve and feel pride when their agency succeeds. Second, as
Daniel Zimmer, former Chairman of the German Monopolies Commission,
recognizes, human reasoning is subject to confirmation bias, defined as the
tendency to accept conclusions consistent with one’s beliefs and to search
for evidence that confirms those beliefs.37 To the extent that confirmation
bias is an innate quality of all humans, initial conclusions formed during the
early stages of an investigation are difficult to dislodge even in the face of
contradictory evidence. Third, people are also subject to hindsight bias,
which is the tendency to believe after the fact that the outcome could not
have unfolded any other way. Therefore, any finding that the second phase
of an investigation was unjustified would conflict with one’s confidence in
the officials’ judgment in opening the case, causing considerable cognitive
dissonance.38 The desire to avoid such dissonance can motivate participants
to pursue the investigation in order to avoid discovery that the original
investigatory decision was erroneous.39 Zimmer thus concluded that “it is all
too human for decisionmakers who in an initial situation have evaluated a
factual circumstance in a certain manner to stick to their original assessment
even after a proceeding has been held.”40 Wils regarded an empirical study—
which found that of the eighteen competition cases that had been fully
adjudicated, courts had overturned twelve of the cases in their entirety and
two in part, with only four cases having withstood judicial scrutiny—as
corroborating the existence of the problem.41
At the same time, there are countervailing considerations that may
counterbalance the need for accuracy. For example, investigations may need
to be kept secret during their early stages in order to prevent the destruction
of evidence and protect the integrity of the investigation. This justification
for a lack of transparency, however, is temporary. As the investigation
(1984) (footnotes omitted).
36. Forrester, supra note 27, at 836, 841; Wouter P.J. Wils, The Combination of the Investigative
and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement, 27 WORLD
COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 201, 214–18 (2004); accord James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic,
Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REGUL. ECON. 41, 41 (2012).
37. See Daniel Zimmer, Competition Law Enforcement: Administrative Versus Judicial Systems,
in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 255, 259–60 (Paul Nihoul & Tadeusz Skoczny
eds., 2015).
38. Id.
39. Wils, supra note 36, at 216–18.
40. Zimmer, supra note 37, at 260.
41. Wils, supra note 36, at 214 (citing Frank Montag, The Case for a Radical Reform of the
Infringement Procedure Under Regulation 17, 8 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 428, 436 (1996)).
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approaches completion, the need for secrecy disappears and must give way
to the respondents’ need for disclosure and the opportunity to contest any
factual findings or legal conclusions.
Procedural protections are costly and must be balanced against other
considerations such as administrative expediency. In the words of Harvard
Law Professor Richard Fallon, “Due process analysis typically calls for a
balancing of the individual’s interest in fair and accurate results against the
governmental interest in efficient and expeditious decisionmaking.”42 The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized this need to compromise between accuracy
and efficiency in its landmark decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.43 That said,
subsequent decisions building on Mathews have tended to give controlling
weight to the need for accuracy.44 And in any event, due process typically
requires notice, the opportunity to present reasons why a particular action
should not be taken, and the right to present evidence and to know opposing
evidence.45
Although due process requires some increase in enforcement costs, it
does provide some compensating benefits. Research suggests that entities
sanctioned by the government have greater compliance when they perceive
the procedures as being fair.46 Procedural protections and transparency can
also reduce future enforcement costs by allowing agencies to communicate
their expectations to the regulated individuals or companies, thereby
promoting greater compliance with the law.
C. STRONGER ECONOMIC GROWTH
Economists have long recognized that due process and the rule of law
play key roles in promoting economic growth. As Adam Smith wrote in
1776, “Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish in any state which
does not enjoy a regular administration of justice.”47 Nobel Laureate
Douglass North similarly noted that one of the greatest threats to a
42. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
HARV. L. REV. 915, 943 n.166 (1988).
43. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–48 (1976).
44. Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2705,
2731 (1992).
45. See generally Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
46. See generally Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196, 1999), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/665731468739470954/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4J4-SECB]; ALEXANDRA A.
WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY (2007);
CHONGHAO WU, REGULATING GOVERNMENT ETHICS: AN UNDERUSED WEAPON IN CHINA’S ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN (2016).
47. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 387
(Thomas Nelson & Peter Brown eds., 1827) (1776).
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predictable and stable economic environment is a lack of institutional
restraints on a powerful, discretionary state and that a non-restrained state
will struggle to make consistent commitments to economic actors, making
economic growth more difficult.48
Modern scholarship concurs with Smith’s observation, confirming that
the rule of law is either an important or the most important, statistically
significant factor that drives economic growth.49 A groundbreaking article
by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer found that protection of property rights
has a positive effect on investment and economic growth.50 This was
followed by the landmark work of Robert Barro, finding that the rule of law,
as measured by the International Country Risk Guide, had a positive effect
on economic growth.51
Other corroborating studies drew similar conclusions. Roberto Rigobon
and Dani Rodrik found that the rule of law has a strong positive effect on
income.52 Stephen Haggard and Lydia Tiede attempted to disaggregate the
concept of the rule of law into different measures. Their survey of the
empirical literature indicated that the rule of law has a positive impact on
economic performance regardless of whether it is conceived of as protection
of personal security, protection of property rights, checks on executive
discretion, or limits on corruption. Their own empirical study found that the
World Bank’s aggregate rule-of-law measure and the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index both had a significant impact on
economic growth.53
Although these studies do not measure due process directly, the extent
to which due process and the rule of law are correlated suggests that greater
due process protections would help promote economic growth.
D. INCREASED RESPECT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
Due process increases the perception among citizens that legal
proceedings are fair. Procedural fairness in turn increases the perceived
48. DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 20 (1981).
49. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH
131, 132–37 (2004).
50. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests
Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 207 (1995).
51. See generally ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSSCOUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY (1997).
52. Roberto Rigobon & Dani Rodrik, Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating
the Interrelationships, 13 ECON. TRANSITION 533, 533 (2005).
53. Stephan Haggard & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where Are We?, 39
WORLD DEV. 673, 678–82 (2011).

854

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:843

legitimacy of the government.54 In 1975, John Thibaut and Laurens Walker
published a simulation in which they varied the procedural protections given
to hypothetical participants charged with illegal business espionage to
measure which proceedings participants saw as most fair and legitimate.
They found that participants were more likely to accept the following
proceedings as legitimate: adversarial proceedings over inquisitorial ones,
proceedings where there were rigorous procedures regulating the admission
of evidence, and proceedings where their attorney was aligned with the
defendant instead of the government.55 Another study identified six key
characteristics of fair procedures: consistency, suppression of bias,
decisionmaking accuracy, the correctability of errors, the presence of
representation, and the ethics of the decisionmakers.56 Additional empirical
studies confirm that representation and decisionmaker impartiality are
essential factors for proceedings to be perceived as fair.57
Prohibiting the same agency officials from serving as both prosecutor
and adjudicator further enhances respect for the government. As the U.S.
President’s Committee on Administrative Management (commonly known
as the Brownlow Committee) concluded in 1937, allowing
the same men . . . to serve both as prosecutors and as judges . . . not only
undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness.
Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the
suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the
commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself.58

Due process protections also lead citizens to perceive the government—
not just particular legal proceedings—as fair. In a survey administered to
54. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (rev. ed. 2006); Caron BeatonWells, Substance and Process in Competition Law and Enforcement: Why We Should Care if It’s Not
Fair, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 3, 7–9 (Paul Nihoul & Tadeusz Skoczny
eds., 2015); ROBERT J. MACCOUN, EDGAR A. LIND, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DAVID L. BRYANT &
PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW
JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3676.html
[https://perma.cc/WT4V-NBZ9]; ALLAN E. LIND, CAROL T. KULIK, MAUREEN AMBROSE & MARIA DE
VERA, OUTCOME AND PROCESS CONCERNS IN ORGANIZATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1992).
55. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
56. See Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27, 39 (Kenneth J. Gergen, Martin S. Greenberg & Richard H.
Willis eds., 1980).
57. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS (1985); ALLAN E. LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Ellen S. Cohn, Susan O. White & Joseph Sanders, Distributive and
Procedural Justice in Seven Nations, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 553 (2000).
58. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 42 (1950) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON
ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37
(1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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over 1,500 people who had interacted with a local police department and the
courts, Tom Tyler found that the following factors had significant impacts
on participants’ perceptions of the government: whether authorities behaved
ethically, whether a participant could be represented by counsel, the quality
of decisions made, whether procedures were in place to correct errors, and
whether procedures were consistent and nonbiased.59 Other studies have
reached similar conclusions, finding the consistency of decisionmaking to be
particularly important in the levels of fairness citizens ascribed to the
government.60
A perception that the government is fair produces numerous benefits.
Studies suggest that procedural unfairness causes people to perceive others
as responsible for results that occurred. Indeed, “[h]olding someone else
accountable for injustice, and directing responses toward the accountable
party, emerges as an overall integrative theme across various models of
justice.”61 In contrast, when government procedures are fair, citizens are
more likely to take responsibility for their own actions, even with outcomes
that are unfavorable to them.62 This research suggests that due process
procedures encourage people to take more responsibility for their actions,
transforming them into better citizens.
The perception of fairness generates higher degrees of satisfaction with
the government. Although it seems counterintuitive, citizens may care more
about whether procedures are fair than their substantive outcomes. In their
studies of interactions between citizens and the police, Tom Tyler and Allan
Lind discovered that some citizens who received erroneous but favorable
outcomes—for example, when the traffic court dismissed a ticket for making
an illegal turn despite the existence of footage showing the driver actually
did so—were less satisfied with the court and perceived the proceedings as
less legitimate than did citizens who received negative but fair outcomes.63
Another study by Tyler showed that fair procedures had a greater positive
impact on respect for law than did the favorableness or fairness of the
outcome.64 Studies indicate that procedural fairness also plays a key role in
59. See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 103, 117–27 (1988).
60. See Jerald Greenberg, Reactions to Procedural Injustice in Payment Distributions: Do the
Means Justify the Ends?, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 55, 57–59 (1987); Blair H. Sheppard & Roy J. Lewicki,
Towards General Principles of Managerial Justice, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 161, 166–67 (1987).
61. See ROBERT FOLGER & RUSSELL CROPANZANO, ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: EQUITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS OUTCOME FAIRNESS 174 (1998).
62. See Joel Brockner, Ariel Y. Fishman Jochen Reb, Barry Goldman, Scott Spiegel & Charlee
Garden, Procedural Fairness, Outcome Favorability, and Judgments of an Authority’s Responsibility, 92
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1657, 1663–64 (2007).
63. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 57.
64. See generally TYLER, supra note 54.
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shaping views of the legitimacy of executive decisionmaking as well.65 Other
studies have drawn similar conclusions.66
E. BETTER COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
The perception of fairness can make citizens more likely to comply with
the law, particularly in borderline situations where they otherwise would not.
Modern scholarship has cast doubt on the notion that the mere threat of
punishment can effectively deter lawbreaking.67 Instead of simple threats,
the more productive strategy obliges citizens to desire to comply with the
law. As Paul Robinson explains in the criminal law context, if the law
earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community perceives
as condemnable, people are more likely to defer to its commands as
morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline cases
in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the
mind of the actor.68

Empirical studies have confirmed that procedural fairness increases
compliance with the law. Tyler’s landmark survey found that stronger
procedural fairness by the courts and policy increased adherence to the law.69
A study by Raymond Paternoster et al. focusing on domestic violence cases
similarly found that the use of fair procedures reduced the rate of
recurrence.70 Other analyses found that procedural fairness has a similar
impact on compliance with arbitral and mediation awards.71 Thus,
procedural fairness has the additional benefit of increasing compliance
among the regulated.
F. BETTER CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY
Procedural fairness also reduces the risk that lower-level bureaucrats
will use their broad discretion to pursue priorities different from those of
agency leaders. Some scholars hypothesize that agency bureaucrats
65. Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Kathleen M. McGraw, The Influence of Perceived
Injustice on the Endorsement of Political Leaders, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 715, 717 (1985).
66. For a survey, see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SWISS
J. ECON. & STAT. 219, 225–27 (1997).
67. See, e.g., Beaton-Wells, supra note 54, at 8–9.
68. PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 162 (2013).
69. See generally TYLER, supra note 54.
70. See Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman & Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair
Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 163, 181–
92 (1997).
71. See E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria V. de Vera Park, Individual
and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 224, 239–43 (1993); Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy, Gary L. Welton & Lynn
M. Castrianno, Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 320–25 (1993).
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maximize discretion, minimize work, minimize risk, or take other steps that
maximize their prestige within their chosen field and prioritize the interests
and concerns of their colleagues over those of agency leaders or the public.72
More generally, lower-level officials may have different visions for
how the agency should operate than agency leaders. Research suggests that
since agency employees typically join a particular agency because they
identify with its mission, they can develop tunnel vision.73 And since agency
officials tend to analyze issues in ways reflecting their training, experience,
and professional norms, they sometimes make decisions without critically
examining the limits of the assumptions underlying those heuristics or
considering alternative perspectives.74 Furthermore, experts tend to
overestimate their abilities in areas where they believe they have superior
knowledge or where their profession has already identified most of the
problems and the likely solutions.75 Psychologists have subsequently
criticized experts as being “often wrong but rarely in doubt.”76
Individual officials’ desire to advance their own careers is another
potential source of biased decisionmaking. The risk has long existed that
agency bureaucrats may engage in overzealous enforcement to promote their
professional advancement, even when doing so threatens fair adjudication.77
Conversely, a staff member working on an action that ultimately proves
meritless may be cognitively and professionally reluctant to concede that
they have devoted several years to a matter that will ultimately amount to
nothing, even when terminating the action would be the proper course as a
matter of justice.78 Bringing enforcement actions is generally an essential
part of promoting an agency official’s career, and terminating an

72. See Alberto Dávila, José A. Pagán & Montserrat Viladrich Grau, Immigration Reform, the INS,
and the Distribution of Interior and Border Enforcement Resources, 99 PUB. CHOICE 327, 339–42 (1999);
Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 291, 316–17
(2012).
73. See Bo Vesterdorf, Due Process Before the Commission of the European Union? Some
Reflections Upon Reading the Commission Draft Paper on Best Practices in Antitrust Proceedings, 4 CPI
ANTITRUST J. 3–4 (2010).
74. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 579–80 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of
Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 559, 564 (1997).
75. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 74, at 559–61, 579–80.
76. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence,
24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992).
77. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 892 (2009); Damien Geradin & Nicholas Petit, Judicial
Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment 13–14 (Tilburg
L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2011-088, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1698342 [https://perma.cc/28NL-9RF8]; Forrester, supra note 27, at 841.
78. See Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 564; Geradin & Petit, supra note 77, at 13–14.
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investigation after recommending that it proceed to the second phase can be
embarrassing.79
As noted above, overly aggressive prosecution can be the product of
cognitive dissonance as well. As General Court Judge Ian Forrester
observed, “When diligent and honest officials investigate a case over a
period of time, say four years, and then issue [a] statement of objections once
the case is, say, 80 [percent] concluded, it is fully understandable that
officials are reluctant to be persuaded that they were wrong.”80 Former
European General Court Judge Bo Vesterdorf similarly observed, “It is . . . I
think a well known fact that, once you have been working intensively and
sometimes for a very, very long time on a particular case, it is easy to acquire
a sort of ‘tunnel vision,’ not seeing the forest for the trees.”81 Or, in the words
of the U.S. Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, “[a]
man who has buried himself in one side of an issue is disabled from bringing
to [his] decision that dispassionate judgment . . . demand[ed] of officials who
decide questions.”82 It is simply human nature for anyone who has invested
significant time and energy into a case to find it hard to conclude that all their
effort was for naught.
G. RESTRAINTS ON THE INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
Procedural protections can also counter undue pressure by special
interest groups. In addition to cognitive and institutional biases that may exist
within agencies, decisions may likewise be affected by outside forces acting
on agencies. In one of the most cited articles in U.S. administrative law,83
then-Harvard Law Professor Richard Stewart advanced an “interest
representation” model of agency action, which concludes that rather than
acting as faithful servants of the legislative process, agencies strengthen
minority and special interest voices.84
Other scholars have built on this work to explore how pressure from
special interest groups can distort agency decisionmaking. Special interest
groups in general, and industry groups in particular, can disproportionately
influence agency decisions because they possess significant resources and
79.
80.
81.
82.

Wils, supra note 36, at 218–19.
Forrester, supra note 27, at 841.
Vesterdorf, supra note 73, at 4.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 56 (1941).
83. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 1550
(1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767
(1996); Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2012).
84. See Stewart, supra note 34, at 1802–13.
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stakes in the outcome of agency decisions.85 Special interests also often serve
as the primary source of information for agency decisionmaking.86
Moreover, many agency staff come from industry groups and may have
ambitions to return to them after leaving the government.87 In extreme cases,
the agency may become so responsive to industry concerns as to become
effectively “captured” by the industry.88 Stewart’s solution to this problem
is to increase parties’ rights of participation and to enhance judicial review.89
H. COUNTERING CORRUPTION
Finally, unchecked power and discretion in the hands of officials
magnify the risk of corruption. Unbridled discretion creates the risk that
administrators will base their decisions on personal preferences or
connections. Even more problematic is the potential that administrative
decisions will be based on political influence or monetary contributions. To
cite one celebrated example, in the 1970s, allegations emerged that the
United States settled a major antitrust case against International Telephone
& Telegraph (“ITT”) in part because of ITT’s promise to provide financial
support for the 1972 Republican National Convention, although those
charges were never proven.90 Similarly, in a speech at the 18th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese President, Xi Jinping,
acknowledged that corruption was a major issue for the Chinese government,
especially at the regional level.91 Transparent enforcement procedures and
public participation will make it harder for lower- or mid-level bureaucrats
to act corruptly, as higher-level agency leaders will be able to notice
deviations from established practices more easily.92
85. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22 (2010).
86. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1331 (2010).
87. See KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 342 (1986); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–85 (2006); Barkow, supra note 85, at 22; Wagner, supra note 86,
at 1331.
88. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039 (1997).
89. See Stewart, supra note 34, at 1748–60.
90. See generally Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree
Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1973).
91. See President Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous
Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 18, 2017)
(transcript available at https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/
content_34115212.htm [https://perma.cc/GJ8N-QYDH]) (“The people resent corruption most; and
corruption is the greatest threat our [p]arty faces.”).
92. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609–10 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that the “first step”
towards curbing graft, corruption, and other abuses of governmental office is “requir[ing] adherence to
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II. RECOMMENDED REFORMS TO ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
The foregoing framework suggests nine areas in which reforms in
practices would prove most helpful in improving due process and
transparency in antitrust enforcement. Ultimately, the desirability of a
procedure depends on a system’s values and priorities. In our analysis, we
recommend procedures that promote reasoned decisionmaking, fairness to
the parties, and transparency. We believe a system that achieves these ends
will reap the benefits of due process.
Differences in enforcement structure make comparisons across the
three jurisdictions somewhat challenging. In China, the State Council, the
most senior executive body, created the Anti-Monopoly Committee
(“AMC”), which is responsible for researching and formulating competition
policy, organizing investigation and evaluation of the overall competitive
landscape, publishing evaluation reports, drafting and publishing antitrust
guidelines, and coordinating administrative enforcement efforts.93 The AntiMonopoly Law (“AML”) gives the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority
(“AMEA”) responsibility for the day-to-day enforcement of the AML.94 In
the first decade following the implementation of the AML, enforcement was
split among three agencies: the National Development and Reform
Commission (“NDRC”) was responsible for price-related monopolistic
conduct, including price monopoly agreements of undertakings and pricerelated abuse by undertaking with dominant market position to exclude or
limit competition;95 the State Administration for Industry & Commerce
(“SAIC”) was responsible for enforcement against non-price-related
monopoly agreements and non-price-related abuses of dominant market
position;96 and the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) was responsible
for the review of concentration of undertakings.97
The Development and Reform Commissions (“DRCs”) or
Administrations of Commodity Prices (“ACPs”) and Administrations for
the standards of due process”); WU, supra note 46, at 1; WRAGE, supra note 46, at 27.
93. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 9.
94. Id. art. 10.
95. See Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing,
NDRC Decree No. 8 (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, effective Feb. 1, 2011) Dec.
29, 2010, at art. 3, CLI.4.143498(EN) [hereinafter NDRC Anti-Price Procedures] (China).
96. See Provisions on Procedures for the Administrative Departments for Industry and Commerce
to Investigate and Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market Position
(State Admin. for Indus. & Com., promulgated May 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2009), art. 2 [hereinafter
SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative Procedures] (China).
97. See Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Declaration (Ministry of Com., promulgated
July 15, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010), art. 2 [hereinafter MOFCOM Concentration Notification Measures]
(China).
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Industry and Commerce (“AICs”) at the provincial level (or autonomous
region or municipality) may conduct antimonopoly enforcement activities
duly authorized by the State Council antimonopoly enforcement body.98 The
delegation of power by NDRC to local DRCs or ACPs is a blanket
authorization, whereas the SAIC delegates its power to local AICs on a caseby-case basis.99 In the new round of institutional reform of 2018, antitrust
functions were centralized by a single agency called the State Administration
for Market Regulation (“SAMR”). Concurrent with the reshuffling, the
office functions of the State Council Antimonopoly Commission shifted onto
the State Administration for Market Regulation.100 The SAMR Notice on
Antimonopoly Enforcement Authority issued on December 28, 2018, also
unified the authorization criteria and adopted blanket authorization.
Provincial-level Market Regulation Administrations (“MRAs”) may
investigate and penalize monopolistic conduct in their respective jurisdiction
in their own name.101 For the purpose of this Article and for retrospective
analysis, we largely stick to the previous agency names and their regulations.
In Europe, responsibility for enforcing competition laws is divided
between the European Commission and the enforcement agencies of
individual member states.102 The European Commission has established the
Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Comp”), which is Europe’s
primary competition enforcement agency.
Each member state also has its own national enforcement agency,
known as a National Competition Authority (“NCA”). NCAs are considered
well placed to deal with cases that substantially affect competition mainly
within a single country’s territory based on national competition laws, as
they are better situated to gather the evidence required to prove and
effectively eliminate the infringements of competition law whose effects are
confined to one member state. Parallel actions by two or three NCAs may be
appropriate when an agreement or practice has substantial effects on
competition mainly in their respective territories and the action of only one
NCA would not be sufficient to eliminate the entire infringement or to
sanction it adequately. In the early 2000s, the Commission decided to
decentralize EU competition enforcement by adopting Regulation 1/2003;
under Regulation 1/2003, NCAs not only enforce national competition laws,
98. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 10.
99. See SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative Procedures, supra note 96, art. 3.
100. See State Council Institutional Reform Program (Nat’l People’s Cong., promulgated Mar. 17,
2018, effective Mar. 17, 2018) (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/18/content_
2050371.html [https://perma.cc/EC78-EGWW].
101. See Notice of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Authorization of AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement (State Admin. for Market Regulation, promulgated Dec. 28, 2018) (China).
102. See generally Forrester, supra note 27.
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but they also enforce EU competition law unless the Commission decides to
take a case itself because it affects the European common market
significantly. This is mainly the case for markets “where there are only a few
players, where cartel activity is recurrent or where abuses of market power
are generic.”103
DG Comp is also primarily responsible for cases involving agreements
or practices that affect competition in more than three member states.104
However, the European Commission may initiate a proceeding sua sponte
based on Article 101 or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”) at any time based on a complaint or ex officio.105
Since Articles 101 and 102 are only applicable if an agreement or abusive
behavior affects the internal market, the Commission cannot take purely
national cases. However, since the effect on the internal market only needs
to be a “potential” one, the Commission’s authority to take cases is rather
broad. Once the Commission has decided to initiate a proceeding, the NCAs
are banned from initiating or continuing a parallel proceeding.106 Moreover,
at that point, the NCAs are no longer able to apply their national competition
law to a case.107 An advisory committee “composed of representatives of the
competition authorities of the Member States”108 ensures consistency and
cooperation between the European Commission and the NCAs.
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and private litigants
all share antitrust enforcement power.109 The FTC is an administrative body
agency with authority to seek redress for civil antitrust violations. It can
initiate proceedings in court or adjudicate them administratively.110 The DOJ
has exclusive authority to prosecute criminal antitrust violations and can also
bring civil cases. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ cannot enforce the antitrust laws
103. See Communication from the Commission: A Pro-Active Competition Policy for a Competitive
Europe, at 16, COM (2004) 293 final (Apr. 20, 2004), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0293&from=EN [https://perma.cc/G4HB-6L4H].
104. See Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition Authorities, arts.
5–15, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 43.
105. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 19–20 (EU).
106. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 11(6), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 11 (EU).
107. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
108. Id. art. 14, ¶ 2.
109. U.S. law divides jurisdiction for public enforcement of various substantive violations between
the DOJ and FTC. The FTC is the sole enforcer of the Federal Trade Commission Act, with the exception
of Section 12. The FTC also has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ over the Clayton Act, and the
Supreme Court has construed Section 5 of the FTC Act giving the FTC authority to enforce the Sherman
Act. The DOJ is charged with enforcing the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts. HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 15.1, at
749, § 15.2, at 754 (6th ed. 2020).
110. See id. § 15.2, at 754, 757.

2021]

DUE PROCESS IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

863

administratively. Instead, it must proceed exclusively in court.111 Private
antitrust litigants, who sue about ten times more often than government
enforcers, can seek damages or injunctive relief for violations of the laws.112
Comparisons are somewhat complicated by broad differences in the
three jurisdictions’ legal systems. The U.S. legal system has a long
adversarial tradition wherein judges are supposed to be neutral arbiters
between opposing parties. This adversarial system is sometimes carried over
to U.S. agencies; however, many U.S. agency proceedings, such as Social
Security Administration disability hearings, are inquisitorial—meaning that
the adjudicator participates more actively by soliciting information from the
parties before them.113 In contrast to the United States, China’s legal system
is predominantly inquisitorial.114 While some EU countries’ legal systems
are adversarial, most are inquisitorial.115 Further, EU agencies rely on the
inquisitorial model.116 Although we acknowledge the broad differences
between the three jurisdictions’ legal systems, we follow the ABA’s
approach to them:
Because antitrust enforcement is embedded in such an enormous variety
of indigenous legal systems found in different jurisdictions, the Report
identifies practices that are sufficiently “generic” to be capable of
inclusion within any basic approach to antitrust law enforcement. Thus,
the Report does not presume the superiority of any particular legal system
– administrative or prosecutorial/judicial, adversarial or inquisitorial,
whether civil-law or common-law based.117

Despite the differences among these systems, we believe that all three
jurisdictions would benefit from promoting rational decisionmaking, due
process, and transparency. This Article proposes nine reforms to antitrust
enforcement procedures that would help achieve these goals.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DOCUMENT REQUESTS, INTERVIEW REQUESTS,
INTERROGATORIES, AND INSPECTIONS
In all three jurisdictions, competition enforcement authorities have the
power to initiate investigations of companies by ordering them to supply
documents, submit to interviews, or answer questions in writing, known as
interrogatories. Competition authorities investigating possible violations of
111. Id. § 15.1, at 749; § 15.1a, at 750.
112. See id. § 16.1, at 761–62.
113. See Michael Asimow, Five Models of Administrative Adjudication, 63 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 3,
6–7 (2015).
114. See id. at 20–23.
115. See id. at 8.
116. See id. at 9.
117. ABA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 1–2.
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competition law can inspect the premises of the suspected company to look
for and potentially seize evidence of wrongdoing.
In China, pursuant to the Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty
Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and Administration published by
SAMR on December 21, 2018, antimonopoly cases may begin due to
investigations ex officio, upon reporting or whistleblowing by private
parties, or following a transfer from other agencies or an assignment by
higher-level agencies.118 The first two scenarios make up the bulk of the
antimonopoly cases. Under the AML, with respect to whistleblowing, if the
tip is made in writing and accompanied with supporting facts and evidence,
the enforcement agency must perform necessary investigation.119 As
previously stated, NDRC adopts blanket authorization to its local offices
whereas SAIC follows a case-by-case approach for the delegation of power.
In a whistleblowing case, a local ACP may initiate investigation directly. A
local AIC needs to review whether the tip points to suspected monopolistic
conduct taking place predominantly within its jurisdiction and report such
review findings, and its decision regarding whether or not to initiate a case,
to the SAIC.120 Cases can also originate if a cartel member submits a
leniency application.
Prior to the creation of SAMR, MOFCOM oversaw merger control in
accordance with Article 21 of the AML.121 Parties intending to conduct a
transaction that constituted a concentration under the AML (including
merger, obtaining of control over another entity through acquisition of shares
or assets, or based on contracts, and so forth) that exceeded State Council’s
stipulated thresholds had to notify MOFCOM about the proposed transaction
and submit certain documents.122 The process was broken down into one
informal phase (the pre-acceptance period)123 and two formal phases (Phase
I, Preliminary Review, and Phase II, Further Review).124 At a maximum,
Phase I could last about thirty days; Phase II could last about ninety days,
but could be extended for an additional sixty days. Requests for documents
could occur during any of these phases. Parties could also submit materials
voluntarily.125 If the notification of the proposed merger transaction was
118. See Interim Provisions on the Procedures for Administrative Punishments for Market
Supervision and Administration (State Admin. for Mkt. Reg. Decree No. 2, promulgated Dec. 21, 2018,
effective Apr. 1, 2019), art. 17 [hereinafter SAMR Admin. Penalty Procedures] (China).
119. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 38.
120. See SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative Procedures, supra note 96, art. 7.
121. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 21.
122. See MOFCOM Concentration Notification Measures, supra note 97, art. 10.
123. See id. art. 8.
124. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 25, 26.
125. See MOFCOM Concentration Notification Measures, supra note 97, art. 11.
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incomplete, MOFCOM could request that the parties revise or supplement it
before a case is officially accepted.126
Article 39 of the AML grants competition authorities the right to
conduct inspections of the investigated parties’ premises. China’s
Administrative Enforcement Law predominantly governs inspections of
company premises.127 Inspections must be conducted by two or more law
enforcement personnel from the agency, the investigated party must be
notified to be present, and inspections cannot be conducted at night, except
in emergency situations.128 China’s AML and the relevant agency
regulations also specify that enforcement authorities must keep confidential
any commercial secrets they access in the course of their enforcement.129
Both SAIC and NDRC developed additional regulations in 2010, laying out
the procedures to govern inspections in more detail. Specifically, NDRC
promulgated the Regulations on Administrative Procedures for Law
Enforcement on Anti-Price Monopoly,130 and SAIC promulgated its
Procedural Rules by Administration of Industry and Commerce Regarding
Investigation and Handling of Cases Relating to Monopoly Agreement and
Abuse of Dominant Market Position.131 MOFCOM exclusively oversees
merger proceedings and therefore does not usually partake in inspections of
company premises, although it can do so if necessary. MOFCOM obtains
information about the parties primarily before Phase I (above) or in the preacceptance phase predominantly through submissions by the parties.
In the EU, the European Commission can initiate a proceeding based
on a complaint, an agency-initiated investigation, or a leniency application
(in the case of cartels), a method that has become increasingly common.132
The Commission and NCAs encourage citizens to report suspected
infringement of competition rules by submitting a complaint form or
description in email.133 Formal complaints must satisfy several formal
requirements.134 They need to be submitted in writing and they need to
126. See id. art. 13.
127. See Administrative Enforcement Law of the People’s Republic of China (Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., promulgated June 30, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012).
128. See id. arts. 18(2), 23.
129. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 9; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, art. 12; Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 41.
130. NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95.
131. SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative Procedures, supra note 96.
132. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 7(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 9; Commission Regulation
773/2004, art. 5(1), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 2.
133. Contacts: Antitrust and General Correspondence, EUR. COMM’N (May 9, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/contacts/electronic_documents_en.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4ZK5LU3].
134. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 5(2), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 20.
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specify the presumed evidence for the violation of EU Competition law.
Agencies initiate investigations with requests for information.135 EU law
authorizes simple requests for documents, which are voluntary, and complex
or binding requests, which are compulsory. Although the European
Commission has the power to take statements by witnesses, it cannot demand
their testimony.136 Interviewees must give their consent to be interviewed
and cannot be forced to answer questions. At the beginning of the interview,
the interviewing agent must state and confirm the voluntary nature of the
interview, as well as the interviewees’ right to an attorney.137 Therefore, in
the EU, interviews are more an opportunity for the party under investigation
to present its views through its employees and have this testimony entered
into the record as opposed to an investigative tool for the Commission.
However, the Commission’s ability to request information during an
inspection is a significant tool. If the Commission inspects a company’s
premises, it has the right to ask company staff for an explanation of certain
facts or documents relating to the investigation and may record their
answers.138 Company staff must answer the Commission’s questions to
fulfill their legal duty to cooperate with the investigation.139 If the company
had not authorized the questioned staff member to provide explanations, it
has a right to submit rectifications, amendments, or supplements to the staff
member’s explanations.140
The foregoing procedures likewise apply to the EU merger control
regime, whereby the Commission requires notification from parties if a
proposed transaction exceeds a certain threshold level.141 The European
Commission reviews the proposed transactions in a single procedure under
the EU’s “one-stop-shop” principle.142 Qualifying parties are required to file
a notification with the Commission prior to consummation of the proposed
transaction,143 or parties must file a Short Form if the proposed transaction
is unlikely to raise competition concerns.144 After reviewing the information
submitted in the notification and potential subsequent requests for
information or inspection, the Commission will decide that (1) the proposed
135. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 18, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 13–14.
136. See id.
137. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 20.
138. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 20(2)(e), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 14.
139. See id. art. 20(2).
140. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 4(3), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 20.
141. See Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 10; Council Regulation 4064/89,
1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 (EC), amended by Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1.
142. See Council Regulation 139/2004, ¶ 8, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1; Commission Regulation 802/2004,
Annex I, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 9.
143. See Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 8–9.
144. Commission Regulation 802/2004, Annex II, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 22.
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transaction is not within the scope of the Commission’s merger control
regulations, (2) the proposed transaction does not raise anti-competitive
concerns, or (3) the proposed transaction raises doubts about anticompetitive effects.145 In the first two instances, the Commission will issue
a decision declaring so. In the third instance, the Commission will initiate an
investigation (Phase II investigation).146
The European Commission is also empowered to enter the premises of
suspected parties to examine their records and potentially seize relevant
evidence.147 In order to ensure proper coordination between the European
Commission and an individual member state’s NCA, the Commission must
notify the NCA about any inspections and is in turn entitled to support from
national officials in carrying out the inspection. The European Commission
can also involve the local police to ensure the inspection is carried out
without resistance. The investigated company is obliged to assist the
Commission in its inspection, but the company is not required to actively
support the investigators by submitting evidence without request.
Such company inspections are often called “dawn raids” because
agencies prefer to conduct them early in the morning. For an international
antitrust case, inspections of company premises in other jurisdictions are
often executed simultaneously to avoid warning subsidiaries or branches in
other countries before they can be inspected. Under certain circumstances,
the Commission can likewise search premises of third parties if there is
reason to believe that relevant evidence can be found there.148
In the United States, the FTC or DOJ can gather information by issuing
a subpoena or a civil investigative demand (“CID”) requesting testimony,
documents, written reports, and written answers.149 The agencies sometimes
have the power to share information with each other or Congress, but
otherwise the information must be kept confidential and is exempt from the
Freedom of Information Act.150
The agencies may also demand documents in a merger review process.
In a merger review proceeding, the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act requires
parties to file a notification form with both the FTC and the DOJ if their
145. Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 10.
146. Id.
147. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 20, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 14-15. For merger control, see
Council Regulation 139/2004, arts. 12–13, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 14–15.
148. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 21, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 49; 15 U.S.C. § 57b–1(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1312. See generally HOVENKAMP,
supra note 109, at 644–48.
150. See Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1314; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note
109, at 644. Practitioners have reported that the agencies sometimes ask the parties to sign confidentiality
waivers so that information can be shared with other jurisdictions.

868

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:843

proposed merger transaction exceeds certain thresholds for asset size or
transaction value.151 Parties must wait thirty calendar days (which may be
extended at the agency’s discretion) before consummating the proposed
transaction to allow the agencies to review the proposed transaction and
determine whether or not a preliminary investigation is required.152 Parties
can shorten the thirty-day period, however, by requesting “early
termination,” which is usually granted in about two weeks.153 The agencies
request documents in three ways: (1) in the HSR filing; (2) in a “voluntary
request letter” or “access letter” during the initial waiting period;154 or (3) in
a Request for Additional Information and Documentary Material (known as
a “second request”), should the agency decide to investigate.155
U.S. law typically permits searches only for investigations of criminal
law and, unlike EU law, generally requires prior judicial approval before
conducting them. Moreover, in civil cases, agencies must obtain prior
judicial approval before conducting administrative inspections of private
companies.156 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception
to this rule that permits warrantless administrative inspections for “closely
regulated” industries that are “long subject to close supervision and
inspection” in which an owner or operator of commercial property has a
“reduced expectation of privacy,” such as liquor sales, firearms dealing,
mining, and automobile junkyards.157 The Court later characterized these
industries as involving activities that are “intrinsically dangerous” and that
“pose[] a clear and significant risk to the public welfare.”158 General rules
that are “more akin to the widely applicable minimum wage and maximum
hour rules” do not constitute the type of close regulation associated with the
exception.159 In addition, the warrantless inspection regime must satisfy
three criteria: (1) the government interest furthered by the inspection must
151. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a, and the related
Premerger Notification Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 801–803 (2021).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b).
153. FTC PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM?
AN OVERVIEW 10 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductoryguides/guide1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5DS-KGWL].
154. Guidance for Voluntary Submission of Documents During the Initial Waiting Period, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/hsr-resources/
guidance-voluntary-submission-documents [https://perma.cc/UF76-XEBF]; Model Voluntary Request
Letter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 2021), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1111341/download
[https://perma.cc/9V2R-ZZBH].
155. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a).
156. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
545 (1967).
157. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700–02 (1987) (quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)).
158. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424–25 n.5 (2015).
159. Id. at 425.
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be “substantial”; (2) the inspection “must be necessary to further [the]
regulatory scheme”; and (3) “the statute’s inspection program, in terms of
the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”160 To meet the third
criterion, the regulatory “statute must be sufficiently comprehensive and
defined” to “limit[] the discretion of the inspectors,”161 such as by providing
for periodic annual inspections or inspections on a “regular basis” in order
to “sufficiently . . . constrain [inspectors’] discretion” so as to substitute for
individualized review.162 The Court held that claims that the inspection is
necessary to further regulatory scheme are belied by the fact that officials
concerned about the destruction of evidence may conduct a surprise
inspection by obtaining an ex parte warrant or may guard the property while
obtaining a warrant telephonically.163 Antitrust investigations are not
restricted to companies involved in intrinsically dangerous activities and do
not involve the type of certain and regular inspection program and limits on
discretion needed to justify foregoing individualized judicial review.
Enforcement officials who want to protect against the destruction of
evidence may obtain from a court an ex parte warrant authorizing a surprise
inspection or to obtain a telephonic warrant from a court while guarding the
premises.
Inspections are often described as one of the most effective
investigative tools for gathering incriminating evidence because they
minimize the opportunity for document destruction and concealment. They
play a particularly important role when enforcement officials have concerns
that parties will destroy evidence rather than fulfill the request in good faith.
At the same time, inspections represent a significant intrusion into the
company’s operations. Inspections often interrupt the everyday business of
the company and require expenditures of resources to accommodate the
agency’s efforts. Additionally, the physical intrusion into company premises
endangers the companies’ interests in maintaining business, trade secrets,
and their general privacy. Because the intrusion into private property often
involves constitutional issues and the constitutional approaches vary across
jurisdictions, the differences in procedural protections that are afforded can
vary substantially.
China, the EU, and the United States differ as to whether an agency’s
request for documents or interviews is subject to preliminary judicial review.
The three jurisdictions also differ with respect to judicial involvement in
160.
161.
162.
163.

Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Patel, 576 U.S. at 427.
Id. at 447, 450–52.
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authorizing and reviewing inspections. Chinese law does not provide for any
prior judicial approval of inspections but does permit a party to apply for
administrative reconsideration of the inspection or to file an administrative
lawsuit. EU law does not require prior authorization but does permit
inspected parties to bring an action to annul the inspection immediately
afterwards. U.S. law both requires prior judicial authorization of searches
and allows for post-search judicial proceedings to return the property and to
suppress any evidence obtained.
1. China
In China, administrative investigations and inspections, including antimonopoly enforcement, are within the scope of accepted cases under the
Administrative Litigation Law.164 Investigative measures, including seizure
of property during investigations, constitute administrative compulsion, but
typically are subject to judicial scrutiny as part of the overall antimonopoly
litigation for administrative penalty. At the same time, minor procedural
violations may not necessarily result in the revoking of a decision made by
an enforcement agency. The Administrative Litigation Law concludes that
where the administrative action’s procedures were slightly unlawful but did
not cause actual impact on the rights of the plaintiff, the people’s court shall
make a judgment confirming illegality, but not revoking the administrative
act.165
Judicial authorization is not a prerequisite for the commencement of an
inspection, but the approval of the agency and the agency chief is a must.166
Administrative compulsion used in the investigation, such as sealing and
seizing property, can be included in the administrative litigation against
penalty decisions on the grounds of procedural violations. At the same time,
minor procedural violations may not necessarily require that an agency
determination be set aside.167
2. European Union
In the EU, any Commission decision compelling the submission of
information is subject to judicial review in an action for annulment in the

164. See Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), art. 12.
165. See id. art. 74.
166. See Provisions on the Procedures for Price-Related Administrative Penalties, NDRC Decree
No. 22 (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, effective July. 1, 2013; invalidated by the
Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n People’s Republic China, Apr. 1, 2019) published Mar. 6, 2013, at art. 20
(China).
167. See Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 74.
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General Court under Article 263(4) of the TFEU.168 This right must be
explained in the inspection decision itself.169 Parties may appeal the
judgment to the ECJ.170 Simple requests for information or interview
requests are not reviewable as they are not mandatory.
Council Regulation No 1/2003 does not require judicial approval prior
to enforcement officials conducting an inspection. However, a warrant might
be necessary if the company refuses the inspection, the Commission asks the
local authorities to impose coercive measures, or if national law requires a
warrant in such a case.171 Even then, the national judicial authority has no
right to control the legitimacy of the inspection itself and can only check if
the Commission’s decision to inspect is authentic and any plans for coercive
measures are not excessive. In a merger control proceeding, the Commission
need only deliver notice containing the purpose and subject matter of the
inspection to relevant authorities (which may include various authorities
from Member States). Following an inspection, EU law permits the party
under inspection to bring an action to annul the Commission’s decision
ordering the inspection under Article 263(4) of the TFEU. This right must
be explained in the inspection decision itself.172 Annulment only concerns
the inspection order. Measures carried out by the Commission during an
inspection (for example, copying of documents) can be challenged in court
only through a challenge to the final Commission decision ending a
proceeding.173
3. United States
In the United States, parties receiving requests for documents,
interviews, or interrogatories may obtain judicial review of those requests.
A party may object to a CID or subpoena by filing a petition to limit or set
aside the request with the agency in the case of FTC requests or with the
district court when the DOJ seeks information.174 If a party fails to comply
with a CID or subpoena (either without filing a petition to quash or after a
duly filed petition is denied), the FTC and the DOJ may seek enforcement in
federal district court.175 Courts review such requests to ensure that they are

168. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 263(4),
2008 O.J. (C 115) 1 [hereinafter TFEU].
169. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 18(3), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 14.
170. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 256(1).
171. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 20(6)–(7), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 15.
172. Id. art. 20(4).
173. See Case T-135/09, Nexans Fr. SAS v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2012:596, ¶¶ 125, 132 (Nov. 14,
2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129701&doclang=en.
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b–1(f), (h), 1314(b); 16 C.F.R. § 2.10 (2021).
175. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 57b–1(e), 1314(a).
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within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite, and the
information is reasonably relevant to the agency’s inquiry.176 Any final order
entered by a district court is appealable to a federal court of appeals.177
In merger review, agencies may seek information beyond that included
in the HSR filing by issuing a second request. If a party believes the second
request to be “unreasonably cumulative” or “unduly burdensome” and has
exhausted efforts to narrow the request through negotiation, the party may
file an appeal with either the General Counsel (for the FTC) or the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General (for the DOJ), “who [do] not have direct
responsibility” over the investigation.178 The outcome of this administrative
appeal is not subject to judicial review.
As noted earlier, U.S. law typically requires enforcement officials to
obtain a court-issued warrant before conducting a search to enforce criminal
antitrust law or an administrative inspection of a company’s premises. The
exception permitting administrative inspections without a warrant does not
apply to antitrust enforcement. Courts will issue warrants only on probable
cause that a search will result in evidence of a violation being discovered.179
U.S. law gives any “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
of property or by the deprivation of property” the right to “move [in court]
for the property’s return.”180 If the court grants the motion, the court must
return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to
protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings. In addition, if
the search is found to be improper, courts typically suppress any evidence
obtained during the search or as the result of information obtained from the
search from any subsequent criminal trial.181 People who were subject to an
unlawful search or seizure may also sue for damages.182
4. International Norms
International organizations have generally concluded that investigatory
tools should be subject to judicial review. Paragraph 2.1 of the ICN Guidance
176. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 747 F. Supp.
2d 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Witmer, 835 F. Supp. 208, 211 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Finnell v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 535 F. Supp. 410, 412 (D. Kan. 1982).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
178. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., SECOND REQUEST INTERNAL APPEAL PROCEDURE 1–2
(2001),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/second-request-internal-appeal-procedure
[https://perma.cc/
8R8F-JHHE].
179. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
181. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C), 41(h).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971).
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on Investigative Process includes “external review by courts” in its list of
“appropriate limitations on the use of investigative tools” and emphasizes
that respondents should have the “ability . . . to contest unlawful use of
investigative tools.”183 Specifically, the ICN recommends respondents have
recourse to an “independent court, tribunal, or administrative entity” to
contest investigative decisions.184 The ICN’s Roundtable Report similarly
included the need for “a mechanism to challenge or question requests for
information” as one of the “[b]asic safeguards” of good investigative
process.185
5. Analysis
As noted above, judicial review of investigatory measures varies across
the three jurisdictions. China does not permit preliminary judicial review of
requests for documents, interviews, or inspections unless officials take a
specified compulsory action like seizing property. Further, China permits
challenges to such requests as part of judicial challenges to final decisions
after completion of the investigation and the issuance of a penalty. Likewise,
the EU does not require judicial review prior to an inspection, but any
binding decision can be challenged in an action for annulment in the General
Court, including those made during investigations. In the United States, a
party can obtain judicial review of CIDs and subpoenas in non-merger
investigations but cannot do so in merger investigations. Inspections are used
only for criminal enforcement, and criminal search warrants require advance
judicial authorization and the immediate opportunity to seek return of any
seized property, suppression of any evidence gathered, and damages.
Allowing ex ante judicial review of investigatory measures promotes
fairness to parties and transparency. In general, procedures at this phase of
agency action help protect against “fishing expeditions”—broad searches for
wrongdoing without individualized suspicion. Allowing administrative
agencies to proceed freely in such fishing expeditions is unfair to citizens
and gives too much power to lower-level bureaucrats, sharpening risks of
corruption and decisions made for improper reasons. Judicial review of
agency requests for information will protect against more extreme versions
of administrative probing. The feedback given in judicial review can also
counter the cognitive tendency of agency experts to be overconfident.186
We do not suggest particularly severe restrictions on the ability of
agencies to seek information. Even the United States, which has the most
183.
184.
185.
186.

ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 2.
ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 3.
ICN ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 74, at 559–61, 579–80, 588–90.
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rigorous procedural protections in this area, sets only a minimal bar for
agencies to satisfy in requesting information. Allowing judicial review at this
stage of agency action will also promote transparency, helping the regulated
understand what specific practices are worthy of investigation by the agency
and thus worthy of avoiding.
B. DISCLOSURE OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE AGENCY PLANS TO
RELY
After completing its investigation, the enforcement agency must
evaluate the evidence, analyze the legal issues, and decide whether a
violation of the competition laws has occurred. This process is internal to the
agency and thus is inherently open to the possibility of bias and abuse.
Consequently, many jurisdictions impose transparency and participation
requirements during this process. This is advantageous because providing
notice to the investigated parties avoids a surprise decision for the parties
and allows them to submit evidence relevant to the investigation. It also
improves the quality of decisionmaking, fairness to the parties, and
transparency—all necessary for a jurisdiction to reap the benefits of due
process. All three jurisdictions require their agencies to disclose the evidence
upon which they wish to rely to respondents, although they vary in the degree
of detail and the timing involved.
1. China
In certain situations, China’s Administrative Penalty Law entitles
respondents to access the evidence upon which the agency is relying. First,
in an oral hearing, the agency must disclose the evidence it is using.187
Second, the agency must disclose such evidence when issuing its final
decision.188 It is not clear, however, how much detail Chinese agencies must
provide. It is also uncertain whether they do so at an early enough point to
enable respondents to defend themselves effectively. In a merger control
proceeding prior to the consolidation of the three enforcement agencies,
when MOFCOM determined that the proposed transaction may cause a
restriction of competition, it notified the parties of its findings and
competition concern.189

187. Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), art. 42(6).
188. Id. art. 39(2).
189. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 30.
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2. European Union
The European Commission must disclose any evidence on which it
wishes to rely to the respondent. The Commission prepares a description of
its evidence in its Statement of Objections, which represents the formal
charges against the respondent.190 The Commission may submit new
evidence either by way of a Supplementary Statement of Objections or, if
the new evidence corroborates previously disclosed objections, in a simple
document known as a Letter of Facts.191 Only evidence cited or mentioned
in the Statement of Objections, Supplementary Statement of Objections, or
Letter of Facts is considered evidence on which the Commission can base its
final decision.192 In addition, any party addressed with a Statement of
Objections has the right to access the file of the European Commission.193
Information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy,194 and
documents containing business secrets are exempt from this right to
access.195 As a general rule, parties are not given access to the replies to the
Statement of Objections submitted by the other parties involved or to the
internal files of the Commission. However, DG Comp also recognizes that
the need to prove infringement or the respondent’s right of defense may
outweigh the interests of confidentiality.196 Indeed, DG Comp has developed
factors that it weighs in making such determinations: the relevance and
probative value of information in determining whether an infringement has
occurred, the indispensability of the information, the harm that would result
from disclosure, and the preliminary view of the seriousness of the
competition infringement.197 When it decides to release confidential
information, DG Comp usually sets up a data room where the parties and
their lawyers get access to the Commission’s file under certain restrictions.198
While DG Comp has discretion not to disclose confidential information, it is
190. See EUR. COMM’N, ANTITRUST MANUAL OF PROCEDURES: INTERNAL DG COMPETITION
WORKING DOCUMENTS ON PROCEDURES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 101 AND 102 OF TFEU ch.
11.3(2) (2012) [hereinafter DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL], http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
antitrust_manproc_3_2012_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q2F-L72Y]. For merger control, see Commission
Regulation 802/2004, art. 12(1), 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 5.
191. See DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, chs. 8.1–8.2.
192. See id. ch. 12.2.1.
193. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 15(1), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 22. For mergers, see
Commission Regulation 802/2004, art. 17, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 6.
194. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 28(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 20.
195. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 15(1), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 22.
196. See DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 2.3.3.
197. See id. at ch. 2.2.3.43.
198. See generally DG COMPETITION BEST PRACTICES ON THE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION IN
DATA ROOMS IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU AND UNDER THE EU MERGER
REGULATION (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/disclosure_information_data_
rooms_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZK2-TSMV].
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limited in its ability to use non-disclosed confidential information in its final
decision.199 Any refusal to grant the applicant access to the file violates its
rights of defense if giving access to the applicant could have led to a different
disposition.200
The EU’s access-to-file system has triggered some controversy. First,
postponing access until after the Statement of Objections is sent out can limit
the respondent’s ability to defend itself. Moreover, the exemptions to the
right to access the file can lead to arguments about which documents must
be disclosed. The parties have a right to see all evidence necessary to prove
an infringement of competition law,201 but an effective defense could require
access to information that the Commission does not deem “necessary.”
Denied requests for access can be brought before the Hearing Officer, but
this process does not fully solve the problem because the Hearing Officer
makes only a nonbinding recommendation to the Competition
Commissioner in response.202 In Intel, however, the European Court of
Justice decided that the Commission must also disclose exculpatory evidence
to the respondent.203
The Commission must similarly disclose the evidence upon which it
wishes to rely in the merger context. In United Parcel Service, the General
Court annulled the Commission’s decision to block a proposed merger
between UPS and TNT Express NV because the Commission failed to
disclose the economic models upon which it relied for its final decision, thus
infringing the merging parties’ right of defense.204 This decision additionally
articulated the relatively unforgiving standard by which courts will annul
Commission decisions for withholding evidence if “there was even a slight
chance that [the respondent] would have been better able to defend itself”
but for the nondisclosure.205
3. United States
In the United States, defendants in criminal antitrust cases are entitled
to full access to the evidence contained in the prosecution’s case files.206
199. See Case T-44/00, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R. II-2223, para. 84.
200. See DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, chs. 12.2.1–12.2.2.
201. See id.
202. Id. ch. 12.2.3.
203. See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:CU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 100–101 (Sept. 6,
2017), curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194082&doclang=en.
204. Case T-194/13, United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2017:144, ¶¶ 198–210 (Mar.
7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188600&doclang=en.
205. Id. ¶ 210.
206. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV-73 (5th ed. 2017)
[hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [https://
perma.cc/KA7K-ZHZP].
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When the DOJ or FTC brings civil enforcement actions in court, the
government is obligated to make initial disclosures of evidence and of
witnesses “likely to have discoverable information.”207 Similarly, in
administrative adjudications, the FTC must make a mandatory initial
disclosure of the names of any individual likely to have information relevant
to the allegations of the FTC’s complaint,208 as well as a description of any
documents, transcripts of investigational hearings and depositions, and
tangible things serving the same purpose.209 All agencies are forbidden from
concealing or misrepresenting evidence.210 In a merger review, prior to the
issuance of a second request, agency staff will endeavor to host consultation
meetings with the parties to discuss both the parties’ and the agency’s views
on the transaction and possible areas of concern.211 Once a second request is
issued, agency staff will, again, hold a second request conference with the
parties to have a “frank exchange of ideas and evidence that allows both sides
to identify and test the competitive theories for and against the
transaction.”212
4. International Norms
There is an international consensus that enforcement agencies should
provide parties charged with antitrust violations with complete access to the
factual record. Paragraph 5.4 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process
provides that “[a]fter formal allegations of competition violations and
presentation of legal arguments are made, parties should be provided with
access to the evidence relied upon as the basis for the agency’s
allegations.”213 Likewise, the ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task
Force advises officials to disclose “all potential contentions of infringement
and (in reasonable detail) the underlying evidence, analysis and
argumentation relevant to the defense.”214
The OECD Policy Roundtable on Procedural Fairness similarly
observes that “[m]any agencies offer the parties an opportunity to examine
the evidence—subject to legitimate confidentiality concerns—forming the
basis for the agency’s conclusion that a violation of the competition laws has

207. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
208. 16 C.F.R. § 3.31(b)(1) (2021).
209. Id. § 3.31(b)(2).
210. See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006).
211. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MERGER REVIEW PROCESS INITIATIVE 2–3 (2006), https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/12/15/220237.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH84-YRSJ].
212. Id. at 4.
213. ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 4.
214. ABA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 6.
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occurred,” particularly where sanctions may be imposed.215 The OECD
further states that “[a] right to access the evidence used to support the
allegations against them ensures that parties to an antitrust proceeding have
full knowledge of the case and details concerning the alleged violations
against them, allowing them to substantially respond before a decision is
taken.”216 The OECD notes that agencies commonly do not provide such
access until “after the main investigation has taken place and the written
document setting out the allegations has been issued.”217 The OECD
Secretariat Background Note on Access to the Case File emphasizes that
“access to the case file is essential to protect the rights of defence of the
parties, given that it provides them with the opportunity to examine the basis
on which the agency or court, depending on the competition enforcement
system, will adopt its decision.”218
The ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in
Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings echoes this idea when it
recommends that “all complaints, documents and other evidence relating to
the subject matter of the investigation . . . should be disclosed to the
Respondent(s)” with the additional recommendation that such disclosure
occur “prior to preparation of any written statement of the charges against
the parties.”219
5. Analysis
Although respondents in all three jurisdictions are entitled to access the
evidence on which the agency is relying, China often discloses it later in the
process after a tentative decision has been made or at formal hearings.
Further, Chinese agencies sometimes disclose information during exchanges
with the respondent during the investigation.
By disclosing the economic and legal bases underlying their
investigations, agencies can ensure fairness to the defendant, better
decisionmaking, and transparency. First, disclosure of such information is
necessary for the respondent to properly defend itself, an essential part of
any due process regime. Second, such disclosures will have the ultimate
effect of strengthening agency decisions. If respondents cannot prepare bona
fide defenses, an agency’s decisions will be weaker and less accurate. This,
in turn, will result in more erroneous agency decisions, undermining public
confidence in the agency. Third, disclosure will promote transparency by
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10.
Id.
Id.
OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON ACCESS TO THE CASE FILE, supra note 14, at 4.
ICC BEST PRACTICES, supra note 19, at 2.
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informing other regulated parties about what actions the agency is taking.
This will help warn other parties about what behaviors will be prosecuted by
the agency, thus leading them to adjust their practices to ensure compliance
with the law. Such disclosure can be enforced through judicial review by
only allowing the agency to defend its decision based on information
disclosed to the parties and specifically referenced in its decision.220
C. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION
The right to legal representation is particularly relevant in three phases
of the enforcement process: (1) investigations: document requests,
interviews, and interrogatories; (2) investigations: investigations of
company premises; and (3) agency deliberations.
The three jurisdictions differ regarding the right to have legal counsel
present during interviews and the role that legal counsel can play during
those interviews. While EU and U.S. law recognizes such a right, Chinese
law does not explicitly advise on the presence of legal counsel during
interviews, and the practice varies. None of the jurisdictions give legal
counsel the explicit right to be present on-site during the execution of an
inspection. However, the similarity of de jure law masks practices that are
quite different. The jurisdictions additionally diverge with respect to
representation by legal counsel during hearings and other stages of agency
deliberations.
1. China
In China, there are no clear regulations on the presence of legal counsel
in antitrust investigations, and the law neither forbids nor guarantees the
presence of lawyers. It is worth stressing, however, that China considers inhouse lawyers to be company employees despite having the license to
practice law. China also requires lawyers to have a license to practice law in
China. Domestic Chinese lawyers who work for Chinese law firms are
permitted to advise during an investigation and speak on behalf of an
interviewee concerning legal issues during an interview. Interviewees must
speak on their own behalf on factual issues.
At the provincial and local levels, there are random cases in which
agencies are sometimes hesitant to have legal counsel present during an
interview because counsel sometimes advise clients to refuse or hinder the
authority’s investigation, despite this being a clear violation of the law.221
220. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
59, 62–66 (1995).
221. The law states: “The investigated person shall cooperate with the price control authority in the
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The maximum fine for obstruction of an investigation—like refusing to
produce documents, hiding evidence, declining to be interviewed—is
100,000 RMB for individuals and 1,000,000 RMB for companies, which is
often too low to induce cooperation.222 Thus, both companies and legal
counsel are not sufficiently deterred from refusing to comply, making it
difficult for the agency to conduct a proper investigation.
Similar principles govern inspections. China’s regulations do not
explicitly grant the right for legal counsel to be present during an
inspection.223 In many cases, however, legal counsel is encouraged to be
present to ensure due process, advise the investigated party of their rights,
and promote cooperation with the legal obligation to comply with the
enforcement measure. Legal counsel may also be permitted to videotape the
inspection for the investigated party’s record. Attorneys are not permitted to
interfere with the inspection and may not speak on behalf of the company or
any personnel regarding facts in the case.
The procedural rules clearly provide that the respondent can be
represented by legal counsel in a hearing. Pursuant to the Rules for the
Administrations for Industry and Commerce on the Hearing of Evidence in
Administrative Penalty Cases, the parties and third parties may entrust one
or two persons to participate in the hearing on their behalf.224 The hearing
procedure also regards “the parties and their proxies making representations
and defense” as a necessary procedure.225 According to information
publicized by Chinese law firms, lawyers have actively participated in and
represented the investigated parties in anti-monopoly enforcement cases.
The biography page of lawyer Ma Chen of Han Kun Law Offices indicates
that he has “represented many well-known international and Chinese clients
in China . . . in responding to cartel investigations.”226 The profile of
Dentons lawyer Deng Zhisong similarly shows that “Lawyer Deng has
latter’s fulfillment of duties, and may not refuse or hinder the authority’s investigation.” See NDRC AntiPrice Procedures, supra note 95, art. 10.
222. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 52. These figures correlate to
approximately USD 14,000 and USD 140,000 respectively. Criminal penalties are available in these
situations. See id.
223.
The authors conducted interviews with various Chinese officials and bureaucrats in the course
of collecting information and support for this Article. All interviews were conducted confidentially, and
the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Notes from the respective interviews
are kept on file with the authors.
224. See Rules for the Departments of Industry and Commerce on the Hearing of Evidence in
Administrative Penalty Cases (State Admin. for Indus. & Com. Decree No. 29, effective Oct. 1, 2007)
Sept. 4, 2007, art. 19 [hereinafter SAIC Admin. Penalty Procedures].
225. See id. art. 32.
226. Ma Chen (马辰), HAN KUN L. OFFS., https://www.hankunlaw.com/professionals/
professionalDetail.html?id=5f4aa842550b97b0015595db005400b2 [https://perma.cc/XXV2-G44E].
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represented a number of multinational firms in responding to investigation
on monopoly agreement and abuse of dominant market position initiated by
the NDRC and SAIC. He is familiar with the investigative procedures and
experienced in developing strategies for response.”227 The profile page of
lawyer Cen Zhaoqi of Zhong Lun enumerates his involvement in antimonopoly investigations, stating that he has represented a Fortune 500 IT
firm and provided legal counsel in an SAIC anti-monopoly investigation,
represented a Fortune 500 communications firm and provided legal counsel
in a NDRC anti-monopoly investigation, represented a Fortune 500
pharmaceutical company and provided legal counsel in a NDRC antimonopoly investigation, represented a state-owned gas company and
provided legal counsel in an anti-monopoly investigation by the Jiangsu
AIC, and represented a private gas firm and provided legal counsel in an
anti-monopoly investigation by the Shandong AIC.228 This indicates that
involving legal counsel in anti-monopoly investigations is common practice.
2. European Union
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes the right
to legal assistance.229 The ECJ has held that the right to legal representation
must be respected during any stage that may be decisive in providing
evidence of the unlawful nature of conduct.230 The ECJ has held that the right
to legal representation begins during the preliminary inquiry stage, including
interviews during investigations,231 and that any stage may be decisive in
providing evidence of the unlawful nature of conduct.232 While it had been a
practice of the European Commission to wait for counsel to arrive on-site
before starting an inspection, this is not legally required,233 and EU officials
sometimes begin their inspections immediately upon arrival.234

227. Deng Zhisong (邓志松), DENTONS, https://www.dentons.com/zh/zhisong-deng [https://
perma.cc/ASY3-26YR].
228. Cen Zhaoqi (岑兆琦), ZHONG LUN, http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2016/08-26/
1413588160.html [https://perma.cc/HC9B-Y4QG].
229. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 405.
230. Case C-85/87, Dow Benelux NV v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. I-3150, I-3156.
231. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1577, 1610, ¶ 18 (citing the
“requirement[], the importance of which is recognized in all of the Member States, that any person must
be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer”).
232. Case C-85/87, Dow Benelux NV v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. I-3155, I-3156, ¶ 26; accord Case
T-357/06, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin BV v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2012:488, ¶ 232 (Sept. 27,
2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=127587&doclang=en.
233. Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin BV, ECLI:EU:T:2012:488 at ¶ 232.
234. James S. Venit, Search and Seizure Powers in EU Antitrust Investigations, 10 ANTITRUST 15,
18 (1996).
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3. United States
Under U.S. law, criminal antitrust defendants are guaranteed the right
to counsel, including the appointment of counsel at the public’s expense if
the defendant is too indigent to afford paid counsel.235 Defendants in civil
court actions have the right to be represented by counsel as well.236 In order
to represent a client in the U.S. District Courts, counsel must be admitted to
the bar of that court. The local rules usually restrict practice in front of these
courts to attorneys who are members of the bar of a U.S. state. Attorney fees
can be awarded to the winning party of an adversary adjudicative proceeding
if it fulfills certain conditions, such as being a small business.237
The right to counsel is also statutorily guaranteed in FTC administrative
proceedings.238 As noted earlier,239 representation by counsel is presumed in
all stages of the proceeding, starting at the prehearing procedures,240 when
appearing for a deposition or investigational hearing,241 when filing
motions,242 when requesting witness testimony,243 or when filing for an
appeal from initial decision of the hearing officer to the Commission.244
When subject to a search warrant, company representatives may ask the
inspecting agents to wait until counsel arrives. Inspecting agents retain the
right to decide whether to wait. Although agents do not always wait for legal
counsel, they usually allow counsel to be present on-site once they arrive, so
long as they do not interfere with the search.245
Representation in front of the Commission is possible by any member
of the bar of a federal court or of the highest court of any state or territory of
the United States and all persons who are qualified to practice law in a
Member State of the European Union.246 The United States allows licensed
in-house counsel to represent clients in criminal, civil, and administrative
proceedings.

235. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
237. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.81 (2021).
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
239. See supra Sections II.A.1.d, II.B.1.c.
240. 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(a) (2021).
241. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b); 16 C.F.R. § 2.9(b) (2021).
242. 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(c) (2021).
243. 16 C.F.R. § 3.39(b) (2021).
244. See id.; 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(g) (2021).
245. See Marcellus McRae, Brian Goebel & Mark Mermelstein, What to Do When Your Client’s
Office Is Searched, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 23, 25–26.
246. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(a) (2021).
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4. International Norms
International organizations widely recognize the right to representation
by counsel. Paragraph 6.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process
provides, “Parties should be allowed to be represented by counsel of their
choosing during the investigation, and should be permitted to present their
views via counsel, their employees, and outside experts.”247 Paragraph 2.4.9
of the ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in
Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings states that “[t]he agency should
allow counsel for the party to be present . . . during interviews of a party’s
employees and potential witnesses.”248
International authorities support permitting the presence of legal
counsel during on-site inspections. For example, Paragraph 2.4.9 of the ICC
Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in Competition
Law Enforcement Proceedings determines that “[t]he agency should allow
counsel for the party to be present at on-site inspections of a party’s
premises.”249
Representation need not be restricted to counsel licensed to practice in
the country in which the enforcement action is underway. Paragraph 2.4.7 of
the ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in
Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings states that “[t]he agency should
allow the parties to be represented not only by counsel licensed to practice
in the agency’s jurisdiction, but should also allow counsel licensed in other
jurisdictions to participate in such representation before the agency, acting
in conjunction with the former.”250
5. Analysis
EU and U.S. agencies consistently allow participation by legal counsel
throughout the investigatory process. China does not have a statutory
requirement to ensure the presence of legal counsel during interviews, but
agencies handling national-level investigations often encourage lawyers to
participate in practice. While Chinese law allows respondents to be
represented by an agent during hearings, such agents are usually allowed to
speak only on legal issues, not factual ones. Further, Chinese agencies do not
allow foreign lawyers to represent clients before them, and Chinese agencies
generally consider companies’ in-house lawyers acting as staff to be
employees, not attorneys.
247.
248.
249.
250.

ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 5.
ICC BEST PRACTICES, supra note 19, at 6.
Id.
ICC BEST PRACTICES, supra note 19, at 5.
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Consistently honoring the right to legal counsel promotes fairness to the
parties and rational decisionmaking. The right to counsel ensures that a
respondent understands the legal proceedings affecting his interests.
Although respondents may often be sophisticated parties, even welleducated people can struggle to understand legal procedures. As Justice
Sutherland once noted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. . . . He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he has [sic] a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.251

Without consistently recognizing the right to counsel, there is an
omnipresent specter looming over every administrative proceeding, creating
a risk that it will be tainted by unfairness to the respondent, thus upsetting
due process. Second, consistently allowing legal representation will promote
better agency decisionmaking. Skillful lawyers help judges and adjudicators
better understand the issues at stake by framing them. Thus, lawyers can
occasionally aid officials in their work. More often, lawyers will ensure that
respondents articulate their positions in the best light. Administrative
decisions are then strongest, and least vulnerable to criticism, if they can
answer the respondents’ best positions.
D. OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE AND RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS
All three jurisdictions provide a formal right to submit a response and
present exculpatory and rebuttal evidence. While the parties in the United
States have a right to a trial-like hearing, the EU and China have different
kinds of hearings.

251.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
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1. China
In China, companies under investigation are entitled to make statements
and defenses regarding the investigation.252 The Administrative Penalty Law
gives them the further right to request an oral hearing,253 where they can
defend themselves and make arguments.254 Respondents may also submit
exculpatory evidence in writing, a right guaranteed by Chinese law.255
Chinese officials emphasize that they have internal procedures and practices
for notifying respondents and inviting responses. Chinese officials
emphasize that they want to hear respondents’ views.256 In administrative
penalty hearings, the relevant parties can conduct examination on the
admissibility of the evidence submitted by their counterparts. After receiving
the respondent’s response, the agencies will issue a final decision.257 Similar
procedures apply to MOFCOM merger control investigations.258
2. European Union
EU law gives respondents two opportunities to present their arguments
to the Commission. First, respondents can inform the Commission of their
views in writing.259 This right encompasses the right to submit exculpatory
evidence.260 The Commission must base its decision only on the grounds to
which the parties had an opportunity to respond.261
Second, the parties can request an oral hearing in their written
submissions, and they have the right to be heard in a nonpublic, recorded
252. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 43.
253. See Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), art. 42; see also SAIC
Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 224, art. 6.
254. SAIC Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 224, art. 32.
255. See Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 32; see also SAIC
Monopoly Cases Investigative Procedures, supra note 96, art. 13.
256. The authors conducted interviews with various Chinese officials and bureaucrats in the course
of collecting information and support for this Article. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality,
and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Notes from the respective
interviews are kept on file with the authors.
257. Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 59.
258. See Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Declaration (promulgated by the Ministry of
Com., July 15, 2009, effective on Jan. 1, 2010), arts. 5, 7, 14 [hereinafter MOFCOM Concentration
Review Measures] (China), http://sg2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/200912/20091206715333.
shtml [https://perma.cc/WF59-4VCL].
259. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 10(2), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 21. For merger control,
see Commission Regulation 802/2004, art. 13, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 2, 5.
260. Javier Ruiz Calzado & Gianni De Stefano, Rights of Defence in Cartel Proceedings: Some
Ideas for Manageable Improvements, in CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE EU JUDICIAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN
HOUR OF PERNILLA LINDH 423, 431 (Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosas & Nils Wahl eds., 2012).
261. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 11(2), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 21; Council Regulation
1/2003, art. 27(1), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 19.
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hearing by a hearing officer.262 However, this hearing is not comparable to a
U.S. hearing. The parties can present their views, but they do not have the
right to cross-examine the Commission’s witnesses recognized in the U.S.263
Additionally, the hearing officer has no decision-making power and only
serves as a procedural safeguard. The Commission’s case team and other
Commission officials are often present at the hearing.264 The hearing officer
makes a report of the substantive issues raised at the hearing, but this report
is not available to the parties and is not binding in any form.
Further, at these hearings, complainants and other competitors, in
addition to the accused company, may have the chance to express their views
at the hearing officer’s discretion.265 In a situation where most of the market
participants have little reason to support the accused company, respondents
sometimes consider hearings to be counterproductive. However, the OECD
observed that most respondents take advantage of the hearings.266
3. United States
In the United States, the defending party in a judicial enforcement
action enjoys the full procedural benefits associated with jury trials. A
respondent in an administrative adjudication has a right to a hearing to “show
cause why an order should not be entered.”267 For that purpose, the
respondent can file an answer within fourteen days after being served with
the complaint.268 At the evidentiary hearing itself, every party has the rights
of due notice, cross-examination, presentation of evidence, objection,
motion, argument, and all the other rights essential to a fair hearing.269 In a
merger review, agency staff will discuss the contents of a second request
with the parties, and the parties are encouraged to negotiate limitations and
modifications to the request.270 Parties can present evidence to reduce the
262. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, arts. 6, 8, 12, 14(1), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 20, 21;
Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 27(1), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 19. For merger control and oral hearings, see
Commission Regulation 802/2004, art. 14, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 5–6.
263. Michael Albers & Jérémie Jourdan, The Role of Hearing Officers in EU Competition
Proceedings: A Historical and Practical Perspective, 2 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 185, 194
(2011); Philip Lowe, Director General, DG Competition, Speech at the CRA Conference on Economic
Developments in Competition Law: Due Process in Antitrust 7 (Dec. 9, 2009) (transcript available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_19_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC2B-ZY3Z]).
264. DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 13.3.4; Wils, supra note 36.
265. Wouter P.J. Wils, The Oral Hearing in Competition Proceedings Before the European
Commission, 35 WORLD COMPETITION 397, 414–17 (2012).
266. OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 39 (2005) [hereinafter
OECD EU REPORT].
267. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
268. 16 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (2021).
269. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1); 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(c) (2021).
270. See DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 206, at III-40 to III-41.
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scope of the second request, in what is called a “quick look” investigation.271
Agency staff may ultimately determine the parties’ compliance with parts or
the entirety of the second request is not necessary, and may close the
investigation.272
4. International Norms
An international consensus is emerging in support of giving
respondents the right to submit a response to charges. The ICN features the
opportunity to respond to adverse evidence as one of its nine fundamental
fairness principles.273 Further, Paragraph 5.4 of the ICN Guidance on
Investigative Process recognizes that enforcement authorities should provide
subjects of formal allegations with “an effective opportunity to respond”
after “presentation of legal arguments are made” and the “parties [are]
provided with access to the evidence relied upon as the basis for the agency’s
allegations.”274 Paragraph 6.4 of the ICN Guidance further provides that
“[p]arties under investigation should be given the opportunity to exercise
their rights of defence and respond to agency concerns and evidence. Parties
should be permitted to express views, present factual, legal, and economic
evidence to the agency, and make substantive submissions during the
investigation.”275 The ICN Roundtable Report similarly endorses giving
charged parties the “opportunity to meet with the agency and provide
additional arguments and insights.”276 Likewise, the ABA Antitrust
Section’s International Task Force states there should be “reasonable
opportunities to present such responses in face-to-face meetings with
officials conducting the investigation and with officials managing the
investigation.”277
The OECD discussion on the final decision-making stage recognizes
that “most agencies provide parties the right to a hearing,” although some
rely on written responses and informal discussions.278 The fifth finding of
the OECD Roundtable Report similarly notes that “[j]urisdictions reported
allowing the subjects of competition enforcement proceedings to respond
orally or in writing to the allegations against them before a decision is taken.
These opportunities allow the subjects of the proceeding to present evidence

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See id. at III-43.
See id. at III-44.
ICN GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 1.
ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 4.
Id. at 5.
ICN ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
ABA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 36.
OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 18.
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and rebut opposing claims and arguments.”279 The OECD further notes that
“[s]ome jurisdictions also allow parties to review and comment on key
submissions by third parties contained in the case file, or submit memoranda
or observations at any point during the investigation stage.” 280 Moreover,
“[s]ome jurisdictions allow parties to submit counter evidence and question
any witnesses that have been called.”281
The OECD Roundtable Report also recommends that “defendants
should have the right to a hearing before the decision-maker(s) or [fully
empowered] agents” in addition to the “opportunity to respond in writing.”282
The Roundtable Report continues:
The purpose of this hearing is to provide the defendant with the
opportunity for a live, in-person presentation of their response to the
charges, for the defendant to question the evidence and witnesses relied
upon by the investigators, including any complainants and others who
have provided evidence on which the agency relies, to question the
investigators and bring forward witnesses for the defence, who will also
be available for questioning.283

The OECD emphasizes that “merely providing a perfunctory
hearing . . . does not in itself constitute adequate due process.”284 Other
mechanisms include “more informal discussions between the parties and the
agency.”285 Together these authorities represent a strong endorsement of
extending to defendants the right of a full opportunity to interrogate the
arguments and evidence submitted against them.
5. Analysis
All three jurisdictions recognize respondents’ right to defend
themselves by responding to arguments and submitting exculpatory
evidence. To effectuate this, all three jurisdictions allow respondents to
request hearings. However, the three legal systems operate differently in
practice. In allowing responses to the agency’s allegations, the United States
provides the most robust hearings, which include the right to cross-examine,
submit evidence, and make arguments. While China and the EU formally
allow hearings, the utilization differs. In China, there is no cross-examination
according to current procedure law, but a similar institution has been
provided by relevant rules in the hearing process. Chinese agencies allow
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 11.
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arguments to be heard and debated, and permit examination on the
admissibility of the evidence submitted by both parties. The EU does not
allow cross examination at its hearings, and it allows industry rivals to make
appearances to criticize the respondent. Consequently, respondents in China
and the EU usually primarily rely on submitting their arguments and
evidence in writing.
Giving respondents a legitimate opportunity to respond to the agency’s
arguments promotes fairness to the parties, better agency decisionmaking,
and transparency. First, doing so fulfills an ancient and fundamental
principle of justice captured in the Latin phrase “audi alteram partem”: listen
to the other side.286 Second, a hearing gives respondents a chance to present
evidence and make arguments, thereby serving as a proxy for a “day in
court.” Citizens will perceive legal proceedings to be fairer if they have an
opportunity to be heard, so much so that many litigants will forgo an
economically rational settlement option just to get it.287 Third, the exercise
of considering and responding to these arguments will sharpen agency
decisionmaking. A rational decisionmaker considers alternative options to
the one ultimately pursued, and this process directly ensures that
decisionmakers go through this important exercise. Relatedly, failing to
engage with the respondent’s arguments can cause the agency to overlook
important aspects of the problem, exposing it to public criticism later on.288
Finally, a hearing (particularly a public one) increases transparency and
allows the regulated and the broader public to better understand the agency’s
actions.
E. SEPARATION OF INVESTIGATORY AND DECISION-MAKING STAFF
Once the agency has collected all the relevant information and has given
the parties an opportunity to present their views and evidence, it must decide
whether a violation of the competition rules has occurred and, if so, what
action it will take. The agency then communicates its decision to the parties
and to the public.
The Chinese agencies have historically followed a multi-level system.
At the different AICs, investigators who had concluded their investigations
submitted an investigation completion report to the legal affairs division,
286. See Rex v. Univ. of Cambridge (1722), 88 Eng. Rep. 111, 115 n.(a) (K.B.).
287.
The authors conducted interviews with various Chinese officials and bureaucrats in the course
of collecting information and support for this Article. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality,
and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Notes from the respective
interviews are kept on file with the authors.
288. See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 90–102 (Sept. 6,
2017), curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194082&doclang=en.
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which reviewed it and assigned a case-handling staffer to examine it. The
legal affairs body then offered its written opinions and suggestions. The
person in charge of the agency then reviewed these opinions, which included
a draft of the administrative punishment decision. After reviewing the
arguments by parties and consulting with various people, including both
agency and non-agency officials, the person in charge of the agency then
made a decision whether to impose an administrative punishment. When the
decision concerned a major or complicated case, the decision was made
through collective deliberation at the relevant meeting of the administrative
AIC.289 NDRC and MOFCOM followed similar procedures.290
Following the creation of SAMR, the Interim Provisions on
Administrative Penalty Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and
Administration now provide that upon conclusion of an investigation, the
case-handling agency shall prepare an investigation conclusion report and
submit it together with the case files to the review body.291 The review shall
be performed by the legal department or other relevant departments of the
market supervision and administration authority, not the case-handlers.292
After the review is complete and the case files are returned, the case handling
agency shall submit the case files, the proposed administrative penalty, and
the re-examination result to the principal of a market supervision and
administration department for an approval decision.293 The SAMR
administrative penalty procedure took effect on April 1, 2019.
In the EU, the principle of collegiality294 formally requires that all
decisions of the European Commission be taken collectively by all
Commissioners after a confidential discussion.295 In practice, the other
Commissioners typically defer to the Competition Commissioner’s
judgment.296
When U.S. antitrust laws are enforced in court, the case follows the
289. SAIC Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 224, arts. 47–55.
290. See Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), arts. 27–39.
291. See SAMR Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 118, art. 5.
292. See id. art. 46.
293. See id. art. 50.
294. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 250.
295. Rules of Procedure of the Commission, arts. 8-9, 2000 O.J. (C 3614) 26, 28-29;
Communication from the President to the Commission: The Working Methods of the European
Commission, at 4, 6, P(2019) 2 (Jan. 12, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/workingmethods.pdf.
296. See Forrester, supra note 27, at 834; Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Effectiveness Through
Fairness? ‘Due Process’ as an Institutional Precondition for Effective Decentralized EU Competition
Law Enforcement, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 44, 49 (Paul Nihoul &
Tadeusz Skoczny eds., 2015).
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normal judicial litigation process. In U.S. administrative adjudication, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) files an initial decision after conducting
an evidentiary hearing. This decision can be appealed to the Commission as
a whole,297 and the Commission can then review the issues in question de
novo. After that, the decision may be challenged in court.298
The three jurisdictions offer a range in the extent to which they separate
investigatory and decision-making staff, a principle called the separation of
functions. Although none of the jurisdictions provide a complete separation
of investigatory and decision-making staff, the United States generally
observes a stricter separation of functions than China or the EU.
1. China
In enforcement agencies, the procedural requirements and related
provisions of the AML exist in accordance with the procedural requirements
and related provisions of the Administrative Penalty Law. As Article 38 of
the Administrative Penalty Law provides, following the conclusion of the
investigation, responsible persons of the administrative agency shall
examine the findings of the investigation. Then, before imposing more hefty
administrative penalties on complex or aggravated violations, the leading
members of the administrative agency shall discuss and decide collectively
(often called a “case review meeting” internally).299 Article 38 also declares
that before the responsible persons of the administrative agency reach a
decision, a review shall be performed by the people engaged in the review
of administrative penalty decisions (review by the legal division of the antimonopoly bureau within the former NDRC and by the department of laws
and regulations within the former SAIC). The personnel who are involved in
an administrative penalty decision for the first time in the administrative
agency shall have passed the national bar examination and obtained a license
to practice law.300
Following the creation of SAMR, the Interim Provisions on
Administrative Penalty Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and

297. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b) (2021).
298. See id. § 3.52(a).
299. See Administrative Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), art. 38.
300. See Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 29, Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz., http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-10/29/content_1499268.htm (“Persons who
engage in reviewing decisions of administrative penalties for the first time in administrative organs shall
pass the national unified legal professional qualification exam and obtain the legal professional
qualification.”).
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Administration also dictate a collective panel of department heads301 and a
recusal system whereby personnel on the case with a direct conflict of
interest vis-à-vis the interested parties shall recuse themselves from
administrative penalty decisions. The recusal of any principal department
head shall be discussed and decided collectively by all principal department
heads; the recusal of other heads of a department shall be decided by the
principal department head; the recusal of other personnel shall be decided by
a department head.302 However, even though all administrative enforcement
agencies are required to comply with the Administrative Penalty Law, their
organizational structure may not be exactly the same. For example, although
the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies do not assign investigatory and
review powers to different departments, CSRC had separated the
investigative power from the punishment power as early as 2002 and created
separate departments.303 Enforcement investigation is the responsibility of
the general inspection team, whereas review and punitive decisions fall
under the responsibility of the Administrative Sanction Committee
(“ASC”).304 The ASC now includes senior members of the judiciary as well
as well as lawyers.305
2. European Union
Like many European National Competition Agencies (“NCAs”), DG
Comp operates as an integrated agency—in which the same staff that
conduct the investigations issue the Statement of Objections and make the
final agency decision about liability.306 The European Court of Human
Rights ruled that this arrangement does not violate the right to a fair trial
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights so long as full
judicial review of the agency decision is possible.307 The Court emphasized
that competition law investigations are administrative in nature and,
301. See SAMR Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 118, art. 54.
302. See id. art. 4.
303. Chao Xi & Xuanming Pan, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws, A Case of Convergence?,
in CHINESE LEGAL REFORM AND THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER: ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION 81, 98–99
(Yun Zhao & Michael Ng eds., 2017); IMF, People’s Republic of China: Financial Sector Assessment
Program: Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Iosco Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation on the People’s Republic of China, Country Report No. 17/404, at 6 (Dec. 2017).
304. Xi & Pan, supra note 303, at 99.
305. Id. CSRC instituted further reforms in March 2021. Zhou Fenmian, The China Securities
Regulatory Commission Revised the Organizational Rules of the Administrative Punishment Committee
to Optimize the “Separation of Investigation and Review” System, TELLER REP. (Mar. 25, 2021, 8:15
PM),
https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2021-03-26-the-china-securities-regulatory-commissionrevised-the-organizational-rules-of-the-administrative-punishment-committee-to-optimize-the%22
separation-of-investigation-and-review%22-system.rkrpcvoq4d.html [https://perma.cc/Y2SZ-2KQH].
306. See GERADIN & PETIT, supra note 77, at 14–16.
307. See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 43509/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106438.
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therefore, need not satisfy the same procedural safeguards as criminal
investigations, but that fact does not render Article 6 inapplicable.308 The
ECJ has held that the standard of review applied by the General Court
satisfies the requirements to guarantee a fair trial.309 A hearing officer
oversees proceedings in DG Comp, but this official simply ensures that all
of the necessary procedures are followed and does not participate in the
substantive decision.310 Indeed, the final decision on the disposition of a
particular case is formally made by the collective twenty-eight
commissioners of the European Commission, although in practice the other
commissioners defer to the commissioner handling the particular case.311
Apparently, the commissioners are known to lobby each other and horse
trade on the outcomes of these cases.312
Subsequently, EU law does not require any separation of investigatory,
prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions. Like China, DG Comp employs
some internal checks on agency discretion. For example, DG Comp uses
“devil’s advocate” teams in an attempt to recreate an adversarial process,
though the team’s members are still DG Comp officials.313 Moreover, the
Legal Service of the Commission is consulted during all stages of an
investigation for a second opinion. Nevertheless, the decision not to require
a separation of functions within DG Comp remains controversial. Leading
academics have criticized the use of the same personnel for investigation,
prosecution, and adjudication.314 Reform suggestions include separating
investigatory and adjudicatory teams, turning the hearing officer into an
independent decisionmaker, or having the Commission litigate its cases in
front of a court.315
The EU does employ some internal checks on agency discretion. If the
parties so request, DG Comp normally offers the respondent and the
complainant the opportunity to discuss the case with either DG Comp staff,
the deputy director general for antitrust, or if appropriate, with the
commissioner responsible for competition.316 Before submitting a draft for a
308. Id. ¶¶ 39, 58, 59.
309. See Case C-199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, ¶ 63 (Nov. 6,
2012), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=129323&doclang=en.
310. See GERADIN & PETIT, supra note 77, at 16.
311. See OECD EU REPORT, supra note 266, at 37 (noting that between the early 1990s and 2005,
“[t]he Commission has not disagreed with the Competition Commissioner’s recommendation on a major
enforcement matter”).
312. See Forrester, supra note 27, at 831–32.
313. See GERADIN & PETIT, supra note 77, at 17.
314. See Forrester, supra note 27, at 817; Wils, supra note 36, at 12–19.
315. E.g., Forrester, supra note 27, at 840–43; Wils, supra note 36, at 218–20.
316. See Commission Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings Concerning Articles
101 and 102 TFEU, 2011 O.J. (C 308) 6, ¶ 70.
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decision to the Commission for a vote, DG Comp must consult with the
Legal Service of the Commission and other interested directorates general
and give them an opportunity to respond to the draft.317 However, the
competition commissioner—who, in practice, makes the decision—rarely
attends the hearing, which means she depends on briefings from staff
previously involved in the investigation.318
3. United States
The United States, in contrast, generally provides for greater separation
of investigatory and adjudicatory personnel. During the 1930s, when the
separation of functions was less common in U.S. agencies, the ABA harshly
criticized the threat the agencies posed to due process, arguing agency
decisionmakers could not fairly review their colleagues’ decisions due to an
espirit de corps which emphasized political loyalty.319 Indeed, the legislative
history of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) reflects the overriding
concern of the drafters on the importance of the separation of functions.320
Just a few years after the APA’s passage, Justice Jackson (who, as attorney
general, was a key player in drafting the APA) affirmed the essential
importance of the separation of functions under the APA.321
For criminal and civil enforcement actions brought in court, the
adjudicatory decisionmaker is a judge nominated by the president and
confirmed by the Senate who has complete independence from the agency.322
In administrative adjudications at the FTC, the initial decision is made by a
duly qualified ALJ, with commissioners sitting as ALJs on rare occasions.323
While ALJs are nominally part of a particular agency, they exercise
substantial independence because they hold tenured positions and can only
be discharged by the Merit Systems Protection Board for good cause.324
Further, ALJs are selected through a competitive examination325 and are not
subject to supervision by anyone in the agency.326 Their compensation and
advancement are decided by the Office of Personnel Management, a
317. See OECD EU REPORT, supra note 266, at 63–64 (discussing and criticizing these internal
checks).
318. See id.
319. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 337 (1938).
320. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON THE ADMIN. PROCEDURE
ACT 203–04 (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 1944-46, at 24–25 (1946). See generally Barkow, supra note 77, at 888–93.
321. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41–45 (1950) (Jackson, J.).
322. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9, 57b(a).
323. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.42(a), 3.51(a) (2021).
324. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211(a) (2021).
325. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(b) (2020).
326. See 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D); 5 C.F.R. § 930.206 (2021).
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government office outside the agency.327
Once the Commission votes to issue a complaint, any communication
between investigative or prosecuting staff and the ALJ or any other
employee involved in the decision-making process is prohibited unless made
on the public record.328 The ALJ’s decision may be appealed to the full
Commission,329 in which case the commissioners may hear further
submissions from the FTC staff as well as the accused company.330 When
members of the Commission sit as the ALJ, they sometimes recuse
themselves from voting on the complaint or the appeal.331 The result is a
fairly strong division of authority between investigatory and prosecutorial
staff and adjudicatory staff. However, it is worth noting that the
commissioners both vote to issue a complaint and decide on appeals from
the ALJs.332 In practice, the Commissioners rarely overturn an ALJ’s
decision, a practice that legal scholars have criticized.333
4. International Norms
An international norm exists supporting the separation of functions. For
example, the OECD recognizes the establishment of “a clear separation
between the role of the investigators and those making enforcement
decisions” as one of the leading methods adopted by competition agencies
to ensure transparency and fairness in enforcement processes.334 Similarly,
Paragraph 2.4.3 of the ICC Recommended Framework supports assigning
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions to separate and independent
departments or at least employing factfinders who are independent of
investigatory and prosecutorial personnel, with strict limits on ex parte
contacts after the report is issued.335

327. 5 C.F.R. § 930.205(a) (2021).
328. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d); 16 C.F.R. § 4.7(b) (2021).
329. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b); 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b)(1) (2021).
330. 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(c) (2021).
331. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting: So I Serve as Both a Prosecutor and a Judge—What’s the Big Deal? 15
(Aug. 5, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/so-i-serve-both-prosecutor-and-judge-whats-big-deal/100805abaspeech.pdf [https://perma.
cc/L6QL-RMG3]).
332. See Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Does It Matter That the Prosecutor Is Also the
Judge? The Administrative Complaint Process at the Federal Trade Commission, 19 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 1, 2 (1998); Barkow, supra note 77, at 894–95.
333. See Barkow, supra note 77, at 894–95; Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 53 (1969).
334. OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 29.
335. ICC BEST PRACTICES, supra note 19, at 5.
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5. Analysis
None of the three jurisdictions maintain perfect separation of
investigatory and adjudicatory functions. In all three, the highest level of the
agency votes on whether to initiate an investigation and whether to assess
liability. U.S. law does entrust, however, initial adjudicatory responsibility
to ALJs whose compensation, advancement, and removal are governed by
an outside agency. U.S. law also imposes strict restrictions on
communications between investigatory and adjudicatory personnel. The EU
and China do less to ensure the separation of functions. Although both
jurisdictions internally make efforts to monitor decisions on liability, the
same staff members that investigate respondents ultimately help determine
whether they are liable.
The separation of functions can be essential to ensuring fairness to
parties and rational decisionmaking. First, it is a fundamental principle of
fairness that people cannot be judges in their own causes. An agency official
that has chosen to initiate a complaint and has invested significant time
investigating a party will hesitate to absolve it because doing so can be seen
as evidence that the investigation should not have been initiated in the first
place.336 While we have no reason to think that antitrust enforcement
officials are more self-interested than any other group of people, the structure
within which these enforcers work should incentivize them to favor
prosecution over dismissals.337 As Judge Richard Posner noted, “An agency
that dismissed many of the complaints that it issued would stand condemned
of having squandered the taxpayer’s money on meritless causes.”338
Second, separation of functions guards against faulty agency
decisionmaking. As noted above, officials that act as both investigator and
prosecutor are vulnerable to cognitive biases beyond those that normally
affect agencies.339 Such officials will be vulnerable to confirmation bias, a
natural tendency to favor and focus on evidence favoring the prosecution.340
These officials will also be susceptible to hindsight bias, the natural desire
to justify one’s past efforts while looking at evidence in the present.341
The solution is, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, to “curtail and
336. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429 (2009) (discussing how separation of functions within an
agency insulates decisionmaking from “political calculations”); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1557 (1991) (discussing how separation of functions
removes “incentives for biased decisionmaking”).
337. See GERADIN & PETIT, supra note 77, at 13–14.
338. See Posner, supra note 333, at 53.
339. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
340. See Forrester, supra note 27, at 836, 841.
341. See id.
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change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of
prosecutor and judge.”342 In the leadup to the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act in the United States, administrators disagreed on how to
situate adjudication within the administrative structure. Although some
advocated for a complete separation by placing the adjudicatory function in
courts, others argued that placing both functions in a single agency yielded
substantial efficiencies.343 The Administrative Procedure Act reflects a
compromise between the two positions by allowing matters to be adjudicated
by an ALJ, while simultaneously mandating a separation of functions within
the agency that insulated adjudicatory personnel from ex parte
communications and from review and evaluation by the agency heads.
Everyone agreed that both functions should not be lodged in the same
person.344 Such a separation of functions serves to prevent “a psychological
commitment to achieving a particular result because of involvement on the
agency’s team” from distorting the final decision.345
In both the EU and the United States, the head of the agency undertakes
the final administrative decisions to charge and to adjudicate. In the case of
administrative enforcement in the United States, the decisions are made by
all five of the FTC commissioners. In the case of the EU, the decisions are
officially taken by the College of Commissioners, although the competition
commissioner receives great deference. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that failure to separate functions completely may produce decisions with a
clear pro-agency bias. With the FTC, multiple scholars have observed that
commissioners almost never vote to overturn ALJ decisions in situations
where the ALJ has issued a decision against the investigated party.346 The
only complete solution to this bias would be judicial enforcement.
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the
permissibility of allowing a person to exercise both prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions depends on the depth of judicial review.347 Even
though the EU has not yet accessed the ECHR, the enshrined rights belong
to the general principles of EU law according to Article 6, paragraph 3, of
the Treaty on European Union. Hence, the interpretation of the ECHR by the
ECtHR is also relevant for the European Courts. The ECtHR decided that
342. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950).
343. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 320, at 189, 215, 216.
344. Barkow, supra note 77, at 888–90.
345. Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 773 (1981).
346. Barkow, supra note 77, at 894–95; Coate & Kleit, supra note 332, at 7; Posner, supra note
333, at 53.
347. A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, App. No. 43509/08 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-106438.
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based on Article 6 of the ECHR, the European lack of separation of powers
within the agency is adequately counterbalanced by the existing level of
judicial review and therefore, does not violate Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
ECHR. In line with this decision, the ECJ explicitly confirmed this view in
its Schindler decision regarding Article 47 of the EU Fundamental Rights
Charter, which provides for a fair trial and can be seen as equivalent to
Article 6 of the ECHR.348 The court stated that Article 47 of the Fundamental
Rights Charter requires unlimited judicial review of Commission decisions
given the fact that there is no separation of powers within the Commission.349
The court found that
As the review provided for by the Treaties involves review by the
European Union judicature of both the law and the facts, and means that
it has the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and
to alter the amount of a fine, the Court has concluded that the review of
legality provided for under Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the
unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, provided for
under Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, is not contrary to the
requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection which is
currently set out in Article 47 of the Charter.350

Moreover, the ECJ held in 2017 that the fact that judicial review is
limited
to the claims of the parties, as set out in the forms of order sought in their
written pleadings, is not contrary to the principle of effective judicial
protection, as that principle does not require those courts to extend their
review to cover aspects of a decision that have not been put in issue in the
dispute before them.351

Clearly, plenary reconsideration of all issues by a court would cure any
defects stemming from the administrative decisionmakers’ lack of
independence. Conversely, any weakness in judicial review makes the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in one personnel
more troubling.
F. PUBLICATION OF DECISIONS
The three jurisdictions differ with respect to the obligation to publish
decisions. While there is an obligation to publish all fully adjudicated
decisions in the EU and the United States, Chinese law only requires its
348. Case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding Ltd. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522 (July 18, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157569&doclang=en.
349. Id. ¶ 36.
350. Id. ¶ 38.
351. Case C-122/16 P, British Airways PLC v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:861, ¶ 105 (Nov. 14,
2017), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=196627&doclang=en.
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agencies to publish decisions concerning merger review decisions. However,
the other two agencies also routinely publish decisions in practice, with
increasing amounts of detail and legal reasoning.
1. China
China’s AML stipulates that after the AML enforcement agency
investigates and verifies the alleged violation and establishes that it
constitutes monopolistic conduct, it shall make a decision according to law
and may publicize it.352 The AML also stipulates that the anti-monopoly
enforcement agency shall publicize its decision to prohibit a concentration
or attach restrictive conditions on concentration to the general public in a
timely fashion.353 Clearly, the AML has slightly different requirements on
the three former anti-monopoly agencies in terms of publicizing decisions.
Decisions of prohibition and clearance with restrictive conditions attached
“shall” (that is, must) be publicized in a timely fashion. However, for other
cases involving suspected violations, the law says decisions “may” (that is,
selectively) be publicized, which works in favor of the company. For
companies, punishment by the government already results in an economic
loss. Publicizing the decision would be a second punishment likely more
serious than economic fines. Therefore, if the enforcement agency believes
that the penalty has served its purpose, it will likely relent on publicizing the
decision.354 There is no mandatory provision for publicizing the decision
under the AML, but the Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty
Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and Administration published by
SAMR establish public disclosure as a statutory requirement in
administrative enforcement.355 When the enforcement agency announces the
final results after reaching a penalty decision, the public can then see that the
respondents had disagreement or objection during the investigation, and that
the enforcement agency has documented and responded to such
disagreement or objection in the penalty decision.356 In general, Chinese
352. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 44.
353. Id. art. 30.
354. See Antitrust Investigators: Listen to Beethoven’s Symphony Before Leaving, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (June 21, 2015, 7:50 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20180212200909/http://www.
xinhuanet.com//fortune/2015-06/21/c_1115679958.htm.
355. See SAMR Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 118, art. 56.
356. For example, the NDRC concluded that Qualcomm had abused its dominant market position.
NDRC Imposes Record Fine on Qualcomm for Abuse of Market Dominance, H.K. LAW. (May 2015),
http://www.hk-lawyer.org/content/ndrc-imposes-record-fine-qualcomm-abuse-market-dominance
[https://perma.cc/M9X6-ZTXV]. Tetra Pak was similarly found to have abused its dominant market
position. Michael Gu & Sun Sihui, Tetra Pak Receives SAIC’s Severest Antitrust Penalty, CHINA L.
VISION (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.chinalawvision.com/2017/01/competition-law-anti-monopolylaw/tetra-pak-receives-saics-severest-antitrust-penalty [https://perma.cc/V8D9-PLUD].
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agencies have started to publicize decisions with increasing frequency.357
2. European Union
The European Commission is required to publish in the Official Journal
of the European Union the main content of the decisions that it takes pursuant
to Articles 7 through 10, 23, and 24 of Council Regulation No. 1/2003.358
This publication must contain a summary of the decision that consists of the
name of parties and the main content of the decision. This includes any
penalties imposed, a final report of the hearing officer, and the opinion of the
Advisory Committee (if recommended).359 Additionally, the European
Commission will publish online versions of all documents published in the
Official Journal as well as the full text of the non-confidential versions of its
decisions as soon as possible on its website.360
3. United States
In the United States, the FTC is required to make all final opinions
available for public inspection in an electronic format.361 The FTC also
publishes a bound volume of its decisions and orders entitled Federal Trade
Commission Decisions, usually covering a period of six months and
containing all final orders of the Commission, along with any Commission
opinions and the initial decision of the ALJ in the case. The decisions are
likewise available on the FTC’s website.362 The FTC additionally frequently
publishes analyses of its reasons for terminating major investigations.
In merger reviews, HSR filings, second request materials, and
information provided voluntarily are all confidential. However, if an early
termination is granted, the identity of the parties and the fact that a filing was
made are disclosed.363 If the agencies challenge the proposed transaction in
court after complying with a second request, there will be a public record of

357. See Lester Ross & Kenneth Zhou, MOFCOM to Publicize Administrative Penalties for Illegal
Implementation of Concentrations, MONDAQ (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
trade-regulation-practices/308342/mofcom-to-publicize-administrative-penalties-for-illegalimplementation-of-concentrations [https://perma.cc/2P7K-BLT9] (reporting MOFCOM’s commitment
to begin publicizing one type of action).
358. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 27(1), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 19; DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL,
supra note 190, ch. 28. For merger control, see Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 13, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1,
14–15.
359. DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, chs. 15.3.2, 18.4, 18.7.
360. Id. ch. 28. For guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission decisions, see
Council Regulation 1/2003 arts. 7–10, 23–24, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 9–10, 16–17.
361. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A).
362. Commission Decision Volumes, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
cases-proceedings/commission-decision-volumes [https://perma.cc/R3W6-5TUW].
363. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a); DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 206, at III-27 to III-28.
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the case in the court filings.364
4. International Norms
There is a strong international norm favoring the publication of
decisions. Paragraph 4.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process
provides, “Competition agency decisions to challenge or prohibit
conduct . . . should be transparent and the agency should, subject to
appropriate protection for confidential information, provide a publicly
available version or summary which explains the agency’s findings of fact,
legal and economic analysis.”365 The OECD similarly concludes that
“[t]ransparency with respect to enforcement decisions is also achieved by
agency publication of outcomes and performance data, and by providing
public access to information about ongoing investigations” and that “[t]he
publication of decisions is strongly connected to transparency.”366 In
addition, the publication of “details and justifications when a case is closed”
via a short press release can help educate the public.367
5. Analysis
While EU and U.S. agencies are required to publish their decisions, only
some Chinese agencies are subject to such obligations. MOFCOM was
required to publish decisions that blocked or attached conditions to mergers,
but the agency did not need to publish unconditional clearances. NDRC and
SAIC also adopted the practice of publishing its decisions, although there are
significant exceptions involving sensitive information. In general, Chinese
agencies are starting to publish decisions with increasing frequency.
The obligation to publish decisions with sufficient information—
including the essential facts, answers to the respondents’ arguments, and
economic analysis—promotes fairness to the parties, transparency, and
rational decisionmaking.
First, publishing decisions promotes fairness to interested parties.
Publishing decisions helps create precedents to guide future agency action.
A fundamental notion of fairness is that a legal body should reach the same
result when looking at two identical sets of facts.368 Publication will help the
courts, the regulated, and lawyers push for consistent results, thus promoting
basic fairness.
364. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a); DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 206, at III-31.
365. ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 3.
366. OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 10, 65.
367. Id. at 31.
368. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989) (listing regularity and the reduction of uncertainty as one of five fundamental rule of law values).
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Second, publication promotes transparency to the public. The law has
the potential to shape public behavior in profound and often unseen ways.369
The laws can help shape and reinforce a nation’s collective social
consciousness, ensuring compliance through stigmatizing pressure.370 In
order for a citizenry to embrace and be pressured by its country’s laws, its
people must know the laws.371 More so, as Durkheim explained, people must
know when laws are violated and punishment is issued, so that they know
that a particular element of the collective social consciousness is being
reaffirmed.372 More specifically, publishing opinions allows the regulated
(that is, companies) to understand the law’s expectations for them, lowering
future enforcement costs and promoting compliance.
Third, publication promotes more rational agency decisionmaking in
two interconnected ways. First, publication enables judicial review, which
provides a crucial second look at agency decisionmaking, weeding out the
occasional irrational decisions made by human decisionmakers. Second,
publication pushes agency decision makers mindful of the potential for
judicial review to carefully articulate their position in a way that can
withstand judicial scrutiny. In the United States, this usually pushes agency
decisionmakers to produce coherent, thorough, and well-reasoned decisions.
Although decisionmakers can theoretically make well-reasoned decisions
without putting them into writing for public scrutiny, the process of writing
usually helps one see weaknesses in one’s own argument, which is why
written submissions dominate advanced legal systems.
G. OBLIGATION TO GIVE REASONS IN THE DECISION
While the United States and EU require the agency to present and
support the reasoning behind its decision in a clear manner capable of
judicial understanding, Chinese law contains no similar requirement.
1. China
Chinese law is developing in providing reasoning in decisions, even
though it does not require agency decisions to include the same degree of
reasoning as does EU and U.S. law. Chinese officials emphasize that ongoing
369. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 104–05 (1921)
(explaining how most of the law’s work is done silently and passively).
370. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62–63 (W.D. Halls trans.,
Free Press 1984) (1893) (concluding that punishment’s “real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion
of society by sustaining the common consciousness in all its vigor”).
371. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Library of Am. 2004) (1835) (discussing how law “envelops the whole of society . . . and in the
end shapes it to its own desires”).
372. See DURKHEIM, supra note 370, at 63.
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communication between the parties and the enforcement authorities helps to
ensure that the parties understand the agencies’ thinking.373 Although these
efforts are governed by internal procedures, Chinese agencies are becoming
more consistent in this area. However, Chinese agencies sometimes release
written decisions that resemble press releases asserting that the relevant
reasoning is in the case file, rather than provide detailed, reasoned
considerations of the respondents’ arguments.374
2. European Union
Article 41 of the European Fundamental Rights Charter obligates
government agencies to give reasons for their actions.375 Article 296 of the
TFEU enshrines this obligation.376 Furthermore, the DG Comp Antitrust
Manual explicitly states that “[t]he legal basis of the decision should also be
indicated” in the published decision.377 The ECJ has held that the statement
of reasons must disclose the rationale underlying each decision in a “clear
and unequivocal fashion.”378 For the Commission, this process should follow
from its obligation to give reasons in its Statement of Objections. As DG
Comp acknowledges, the purpose of the Statement of Objections is to
provide respondents with “all the information they need to defend
themselves effectively and to comment on the allegations made against
them.”379 This is even more relevant for final Commission decisions. DG
Comp further acknowledges that “Commission decisions must state the
reasons on which they are based.”380
3. United States
Under the U.S. court-created doctrine of hard-look review, an agency’s
reasoning must not be cryptic or confusing. Instead the agency must present

373.
The authors conducted interviews with various Chinese officials and bureaucrats in the course
of collecting information and support for this Article. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality,
and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Notes from the respective
interviews are kept on file with the authors.
374. Nathan Bush, Oracle Bones: Limited Lessons from China’s Merger Rulings, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Aug. 2009, 1, 4; Angela Huyue Zhang, The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China:
An Institutional Design Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 631, 652–53 (2011).
375. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 41(2)(c), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391,
404.
376. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 296.
377. DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 18.7.
378. Case C-417/11 P, Council v. Bamba, ECLI:EU:C:2012:718, ¶ 50 (Nov. 15, 2012), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0417. For mergers, see Council
Regulation 139/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 17.
379. DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 11.1.
380. Id. ch. 5.3.
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its decision in a manner capable of judicial comprehension.381 Agencies must
respond in a reasoned manner to the major arguments raised, explain how
the agency resolved any significant problems, and show how that resolution
led the agency to its ultimate determination.382 Brief, conclusory statements
are insufficient.383 The discussion should ensure that all the “major issues of
policy were ventilated” and disclose “why the agency reacted to them as it
did.”384 An agency “cannot simply declare its ‘expertise’; it must exercise
that expertise and demonstrate sufficiently that it has done so.”385
4. International Norms
There is an international consensus that agencies should disclose the
reasoning underlying their decisions. The OECD succinctly states that
“decisions should provide clear detailed description of the case facts, the
applicable rules and the reasons for the legal and factual findings” to make
judicial review possible.386 The OECD also requires that agency decisions
provide “sufficient detail so as to identify the basis and rationale for the
decision.”387 A proper explanation of the court’s reasoning plays a critical
role in avoiding corrupt decisions, providing a sense of fairness, providing
guidance to the public, promoting public confidence, and in supporting
judicial review. Finally, the ICN emphasizes, “All final written enforcement
decisions on violations should include detailed explanations of the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, evidence relied upon, party arguments, and
sanctions.”388
5. Analysis
While EU and U.S. agencies are obligated to articulate the reasons for
their determinations in their published decisions, Chinese agencies are not.
In practice, however, Chinese agencies have articulated reasons in an
increasingly detailed manner, especially more recently.
The obligation of a legal authority to give reasons for its decision is a
fundamental principle of justice. As two European scholars recently
381. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1037–38 (4th Cir. 1976);
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1074–
1112 (1997).
382. Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
383. See Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Wawszkiewicz v. Dep’t of Treasury, 670 F.2d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
384. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
385. Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
386. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, supra note 14, at 19.
387. OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 18.
388. ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 16.
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observed, it is “inconceivable” not to honor this rule.389 However, the
obligation to articulate one’s decision in writing does not necessarily capture
an agency’s need to give its reasons publicly. Indeed, agencies might initially
prefer to keep their written decisions private. However, an agency’s
obligation to publicly give reasons for its decisions also promotes
transparency, rational decisionmaking, and fairness to the parties.
First, requiring agencies to publicly give reasons promotes
transparency. Permitting agencies to produce reasons for their decisions post
hoc during judicial review creates a risk that judges will be given reasons
different from those the agencies relied on at the time of the decision. This
creates an opportunity for agency officials to hide the true reasons for their
actions, potentially helping to mask arbitrary decisionmaking or corruption.
Moreover, this requirement helps judges evaluate the true reasons for agency
action, enabling them to set aside decisions based on improper
considerations.390 As Opdebeek and De Somer observe, “[t]he core idea
behind the duty to give reasons is that it offers transparency on the level of
the motives or justifications that have inspired a decision.”391
Second and relatedly, requiring agencies to publicly give reasons
promotes more rational decisionmaking. If agencies may produce reasons
for their decisions post hoc during judicial review, they will forward reasons
meant to please courts—not necessarily the real reasons they originally
acted. The primary reason governments employ administrative agencies is to
concentrate expertise.392 Forcing agencies to publicly give reasons for their
decisions helps push decisionmakers to make and defend decisions based on
expertise. American legal scholars capture this idea through the Chenery
doctrine, named for a Supreme Court case holding that judges will only look
to the rationales the agency gave at the time of the decision—not those given
post hoc during judicial review.393 As the Court explained in a later case,
“Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate

389. Ingrid Opdebeek & Stéphanie De Somer, The Duty to Give Reasons in the European Legal
Area: A Mechanism for Transparent and Accountable Administrative Decision-Making? A Comparison
of Belgian, Dutch, French and EU Administrative Law, 2 ROCZNIK ADMINISTRACJI PUBLICZNEJ 97, 97–
98 (2016) (Pol.).
390. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1962) (holding that “for
the courts to determine whether the agency has” exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law, the
agency “must disclose the basis of its order and give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion
with which Congress has empowered it”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (holding that
“the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying
the action under review” and that “the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the
grounds upon which the administrative agency acted by clearly disclosed and adequately sustained”).
391. Opderbeck & De Somer, supra note 389, at 131.
392. See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28, 95–103, 132–40 (1938).
393. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92–95 (1943).
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counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.
It is the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possesses the
expertise that can enlighten and rationalize . . . .”394
Third, an agency’s obligation to publicly give reasons promotes fairness
to the parties during judicial review. As the OECD explains, “decisions
should provide clear detailed description of the case facts, the applicable
rules and the reasons for the legal and factual findings” to make judicial
review possible.395 Administrative agencies are given vast amounts of
concentrated power to bring government expertise to bear on difficult
problems; this justifies sacrifices by individual citizens. But fairness requires
that individual citizens only make sacrifices for the sake of agency expertise,
not other improper considerations that might have contaminated agency
decisionmaking. As Jerry Mashaw explains, subjecting a citizen “to
administrative authority that is unreasoned is [to treat him] as a mere object
of the law or political power, not a subject with independent rational
capacities.”396 In other words, the obligation to state reasons is essential to
ensuring the dignity of citizens in the face of the modern administrative
state.397 As Mashaw explains, “[a]uthority without reason is literally
dehumanizing.”398 Requiring agencies to publicly give reasons for their
decisions ensures that their decisions will be evaluated according to the
merits of the expertise that motivated them. This promotes the appropriate
amount of fairness to citizens in their interactions with agencies.
H. PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SETTLEMENTS AND
COMMITMENTS
All three jurisdictions vary widely in respect to settlements, which are
quite common. Competition authorities and parties under investigation often
find it mutually advantageous to enter into settlement agreements instead of
proceeding to a full adjudication on the merits. The process of obtaining
consent decrees is typically much faster and avoids the high costs of
adversarial proceedings. Moreover, the parties under investigation are often
more forthcoming with information when a settlement is proposed, and they
can avoid an official admission of liability. As a result, settlements are legal
in all three jurisdictions.
The three jurisdictions follow different practices with respect to public
394. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971).
395. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, supra note 14, at 19.
396. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the
Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 104 (2007).
397. Opdebeek & De Somer, supra note 389, at 137.
398. Mashaw, supra note 396, at 118.
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scrutiny of proposed settlements. U.S. law provides for a formal process of
notice and comment, while EU law requires that any proposed settlement be
subject to a “market test” in which complainants and interested third parties
are invited to submit their observations. Chinese law has not traditionally
exposed proposed settlements to public scrutiny, although recent reforms to
merger review procedures now require MOFCOM to submit simple cases to
public scrutiny and market tests.
1. China
Article 45 of the Anti-Monopoly Law permits enforcement agencies to
suspend an investigation if the investigated party commits to specific
measures that can eliminate the consequences of their suspected unlawful
behavior.399 This commitment system is not used for cartels or mergers.
Modeled on Article 9 of the EU’s Council Regulation No. 1/2003
commitment system, Article 45 is a way for the investigated party to come
to a mutual agreement with the antitrust enforcement agency without having
to litigate the matter, benefiting both parties by saving time and litigation
costs. Under the commitment system, an investigated party may apply to an
agency for a suspension; a suspension would make a termination of the
investigation possible without a formal decision to penalize the party being
made, if the commitments have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the
authority. The application must include (1) facts of the party’s involvement
in the alleged monopoly, (2) measures it commits to taking to eliminate the
harm caused by its alleged monopolistic conduct, (3) the time period in
which it can perform its commitments, and (4) any other proposed
commitments.400 The commitment proposal is negotiated between the party
and agency, and if ultimately accepted, the agency may suspend the
investigation.401 The party must then submit written reports on its
performance of its commitments, and the agency must supervise its
performance.402 If the party fulfills its commitments to the satisfaction of the
agency, the agency can, at its discretion, terminate the investigation.403 The
agency has the authority to resume the investigation, however, if the party
fails to perform its commitments, there are material changes in facts on
399. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 45.
400. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 15; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, art. 16.
401. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 16; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, art. 17.
402. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 17; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, arts. 18, 19.
403. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 18; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, art. 19.
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which the suspension was granted, or the suspension was granted on the basis
of incomplete or untrue information provided by the party.404
Publication of commitments is not mandatory either before or after their
adoption. In practice, regarding the termination of investigations upon
fulfillment of commitments by an undertaking, the enforcement agency will
publish a Decision to Terminate Investigation, which contains a statement of
facts, commitments, and their fulfillment. Commitment decisions must be
issued to investigated parties and must include a description of the facts of
the alleged violation, the law being allegedly violated, the specifics of the
commitment, the time limit to perform the commitment, measures of
performance, and legal liability in the event of nonperformance or
incomplete performance of the commitment.405 Additionally, for standard
cases, MOFCOM may market test remedy proposals by engaging with the
public via hearings, investigations, and consultations with experts,
representatives of trade associations, other relevant government agencies,
and consumers, among others.406
China’s commitment system has no mechanism for judicial review prior
to the issuance of a commitment. An investigated party that proposes and
negotiates commitments with an agency may be held liable for
nonperformance.407 Parties who are not satisfied with a proposed
commitment may challenge it in court only after it is finalized.408 However,
if the courts consider the commitment as a decision delivered by the
agencies, there might be a possibility to challenge the agencies’ decision to
suspend or terminate the investigation by applying for administrative
reconsideration or bringing an administrative action before court according
to article 53 of the AML.
2. European Union
In the EU, one must distinguish two very different procedures for
ending an investigation without a formal decision stating a violation of EU
competition law: commitment decisions in Article 102 TFEU cases and
settlements in Article 101 TFEU cases. The European Commission initially
used a number of informal mechanisms to settle disputes on a case-by-case

404. See supra note 403.
405. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 16; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, art. 17.
406. See MOFCOM Concentration Review Measures, supra note 258, art. 7.
407. See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 18(1); SAIC Monopoly Cases
Investigative Procedures, supra note 96, art. 17.
408. NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 95, art. 21; SAIC Monopoly Cases Investigative
Procedures, supra note 96, arts. 27, 28, 29.
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basis, including its leniency program.409 The Commission began formalizing
its settlement rules in 2003 by adopting a regulation that explicitly authorizes
the Commission to accept commitments for non-cartel cases. 410 These
commitments do not establish an infringement or impose a fine. Instead, they
make the commitments offered by the companies legally binding, thereby
bringing suspect behavior (and the need for further investigation) to an
end.411 DG Comp and the relevant NCAs also consider and accept
commitment proposals during merger control proceedings.412
Distinct from these commitment decisions, the Commission introduced
a separate settlement procedure for cartel cases in 2008.413 Cartel settlements
are still formal decisions, but they aim to simplify and expedite the procedure
leading to the adoption of a formal decision, and also reward parties for
participating in the procedure by reducing fines by 10%.414
The European Commission has the discretion to determine which cases
are suitable for a settlement procedure.415 After the Commission gathers and
analyzes the relevant evidence, it may invite the parties to express their
interest in engaging in settlement discussions.416 The Commission will then
begin bilateral settlement discussions.417 A party who seeks to settle must
formally declare its interest and submit a settlement submission
(1) acknowledging liability for infringement, (2) indicating the maximum
fine the party anticipates the Commission will levy, (3) confirming that the
Commission has given the party the opportunity to be heard, (4) confirming
that the party will not request access to the file or a formal oral hearing, and
(5) agreeing to receive the Statement of Objectives and final decision in an
EU language.418 The Commission then issues a Statement of Objections
detailing the objections raised against the parties—although the Statement of
Objections is typically much shorter for commitments than for standard

409. See Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission Adopts Revised
Leniency Notice to Reward Companies that Report Cartels (Dec. 7, 2006) (on file with authors).
410. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
411. See id. art. 9(1).
412. See Commission Regulation 802/2004, arts. 19(1), 20, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1, 7; Council
Regulation 139/2004, arts. 4, 8(2), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 8, 11.
413. See Commission Regulation 622/2008, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 171) 3, 4–5.
414. See Commission Notice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of the Adoption of
Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Cartel Cases,
2008 O.J. (C 167) 1, 5 ¶ 32 [hereinafter Commission Notice on Settlement Procedures]; Council
Regulation 1/2003, art. 23, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 16–17.
415. See Commission Notice on Settlement Procedures, supra note 414, ¶ 5; Council Regulation
1/2003, art. 23, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 16–17.
416. See Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 21.
417. See Commission Notice on Settlement Procedures, supra note 414, ¶ 14.
418. See id. at 3–4; Council Regulation 1/2003, arts. 7, 23, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 9, 16–17.
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procedures—and the party will agree to the contents of the statement.419 A
final decision can then be adopted by the Commission.
Proposed cartel settlements are not made available to the public. Article
6(6) of Directive 2014/104/EU protects the settlement submissions from
disclosure in private, follow-on litigation.420 Final settlement decisions are
published, but the decisions are typically shorter and less detailed than
standard decisions. Specifically, the law requires the publication to state the
names of the parties, the main content of the decision, and any penalties
imposed.421 Settlement decisions are published in the European
Commission’s Official Journal, and although it is not required by law, it is
common practice for the decision to be published on DG Comp’s website.422
Public notice is given in cases pursuing a commitment rather than a
settlement. Article 27(4) of the Council Regulation No. 1/2003 states that if
the Commission intends to pursue a commitment with an investigated party,
it must “publish a concise summary of the case and the main content of the
commitments or of the proposed course of action.”423 This publication is
often called a “market test notice.”424 The Commission also typically issues
a press release and, when applicable, delivers the market test to the
complainant. Interested third parties are invited to “submit their
observations” for a specified time period, which must be a minimum of thirty
days.425 The case team may additionally orally discuss the commitments with
market participants and inform the investigated party of the market test
results.426 The market test should not be misunderstood as requiring the
public approval of the commitments. Instead, it is a tool that supplies useful
information to the Commission on possible improvements to the proposed
commitments. On occasion, the case team and Commission may make minor
or significant revisions based on the market test results before formally
approving the commitments. The market test approach is similarly used in
merger control proceedings.427
The ECJ has recognized that publication of proposed commitments
provides numerous benefits. Publication serves the public’s interest to know
419.
420.
421.
422.

See Commission Notice on Settlement Procedures, supra note 414, ¶ 23.
Council Directive 2014/104/EU, art. 6(6), 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1, 13.
See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 30(1), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 20.
OECD COMPETITION COMM., COMMITMENT DECISIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES: NOTE BY THE
EUROPEAN UNION 4 (2016).
423. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 27(4), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 19.
424. See DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 16.3.5.1.
425. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 27(4), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 19.
426. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 5.
427. See DG COMPETITION, BEST PRACTICES ON THE CONDUCT OF EC MERGER CONTROL
PROCEEDINGS § 5.2 (2004).
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the reasoning behind Commission decisions as fully as possible. Economic
operators should know “the sort of behav[ior] for which they are liable to be
penalized,” and persons harmed by the violation should be “informed of the
details thereof so that they may, where appropriate, assert their rights against
the undertakings punished, and in view of the fined undertaking’s ability to
seek judicial review of such a decision.”428
Commitment decisions have triggered criticism mainly for two reasons.
First, their limited publicity raises transparency concerns.429 Second, such
decisions do not contribute to the development of the case law. Since
commitment decisions do not state whether a certain behavior violates
competition law provisions, such decisions do not increase the predictability
of Commission decisions in the future.430
Judicial review is available for both commitments and settlements. The
scope of judicial review of commitments is limited to obvious errors of
law.431 Settlements, on the other hand, can only be appealed by the involved
parties. Although the investigated party has acknowledged infringement in
the settlement, it can still appeal the settlement to the General Court on
grounds of the Commission’s “lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule
of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.”432 The most
common, and most successful, appeal claim between 2007 and 2017 was that
the Commission miscalculated the amount of the fine charged to the
appellant, in violation of the EC’s fining guidelines.433
3. United States
In the United States, most cases, whether criminal or civil, are resolved
via settlements. Of 367 individual defendants charged between 1996 and
2005 with criminal antitrust violations, 307 (84%) resolved their cases with

428. See Case T-198/03, Bank Austria Creditanstalt v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-1439, ¶ 78
(alteration in original).
429. Frederic Jenny, Worst Decision of the EU Court of Justice: The Alrosa Judgment in Context
and the Future of Commitment Decisions, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 701, 736 (2015).
430. See generally Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions Under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003:
The Developing EC Practice and Case Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008:
ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW 547 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis
eds., 2010).
431. See Case T-76/14, Morningstar, Inc. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2016:481, ¶ 46 (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183323&doclang=en.
432. See TFEU, supra note 168, art. 263.
433. See Dieter Paemen & Jonathan Blondeel, Appealing EU Cartel Decisions Before the European
Courts: Winning (and Losing) Arguments, INT’L BAR ASS’N (May 17, 2017), https://www.ibanet.org/
Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=E69A2864-C396-4EE2-9048-ABBE9FE5B97E [https://perma.cc/
99K3-K832].
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a plea bargain.434 The DOJ also settles almost all civil cases and rarely takes
any to trial. From 2010 to 2019, the DOJ settled 88% of its civil cases.435
From 2011 to 2016, the FTC similarly settled 91% of its civil cases.436
The DOJ pursues settlements by filing consent decrees or civil consent
judgments in a U.S. federal district court to obtain relief without having to
go to trial. Consent decrees, however, cannot be used to settle certain severe
horizontal conduct cases such as price-fixing and market allocations, which
are instead prosecuted criminally. The DOJ’s settlement procedures are set
out in the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, more commonly
known as the Tunney Act, which was enacted to address concerns of abuse
of agency discretion in antitrust settlements.437 The Tunney Act establishes
a process for public scrutiny of and comment on proposed settlements and
allows for participation by interested parties and the public.438 The court
must accept the settlement proposed by the DOJ if it is within the “reaches
of the public interest,”439 which gives the DOJ broad discretion over the
remedy.
The FTC Rules of Practice create a settlement process that is parallel to
the one imposed by the Tunney Act. Settlements are negotiated by FTC staff,
senior management, and sometimes a commissioner. The FTC staff is
encouraged to pursue settlement negotiations, and any investigated party
must be afforded the opportunity to propose a settlement.440 Proposed
settlements are detailed in a consent order, and the Commission votes to
approve the order.441 If the Commission approves the order, the parties and
the staff will execute an Agreement Containing Consent Order (“ACCO”)
detailing the critical representations and waivers.442 Parties agree to waive
their rights to judicial review and acknowledge the finality and enforceability
of the consent order. In the ACCO, the parties will also confirm receipt of a
complaint prepared by the FTC that lays out the factual basis for bringing
the case and the alleged violations of antitrust law. After execution of the
ACCO, the Commissioners will vote again to approve the settlement. If a
majority of the Commission finds a “reason to believe” that a law has been
434. F. Joseph Warin, David P. Burns & John W.F. Chesley, To Plead or Not to Plead?: Reviewing
a Decade of Criminal Antitrust Trials, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2006, 1, 1–2.
435. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2010–2019, at 5,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/WU8C-RUSJ].
436. OECD COMPETITION COMM., COMMITMENT DECISIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES: NOTE BY THE
UNITED STATES 7 (2016).
437. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(h)).
438. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(c).
439. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
440. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (2021).
441. See id. § 2.34(a).
442. 16 FED. PROC. FORMS § 65:111 (2021); 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.32, 3.25 (2021).
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violated and that the proposed consent order provides a sufficient remedy for
that violation, the agency will open the proposed order for public
comment.443 If no changes are warranted after receiving public comment, the
Commission will vote again for final approval of the consent order.444
Both the FTC and the DOJ have established processes for public
scrutiny of and comment on proposed settlements. The Tunney Act requires
the DOJ to submit to the court and publish in the Federal Register the
proposed settlement along with a Competitive Impact Statement (“CIS”).445
In it, the DOJ must describe the nature and purpose of the proceeding and
the facts giving rise to the alleged violation of antitrust law; explain the
proposed final judgment, why it is appropriate, its anticipated effects on
competition, how it is in the public interest; and describe and evaluate any
alternative remedies.446 The proposed judgment and CIS must be published
in the Federal Register at least sixty days prior to the effective date of the
proposed settlement, allowing time for interested parties to submit comments
and amicus briefs via the DOJ’s website.447 The DOJ must also publish a
summary of the proposed settlement in a newspaper.448 These measures are
intended to seek countervailing arguments and alternatives from the public
or other interested parties and to reduce arbitrary exercises of discretion by
implementing more transparency. The DOJ must publish all comments
received (typically done through its website), unless doing so would be so
burdensome that the public would be unable to benefit from public access to
comments. In that case, the court may authorize an alternative method of
disseminating public comments.449 The DOJ is also required to consider
relevant comments and publish responses to them in order to ensure that the
agency meaningfully examines any significant points raised by the public
and all relevant alternatives.450 Once the agency has completely reviewed all
evidence collected, it announces whether it intends to finalize the settlement
or pursue its complaint in court.451 Parties may propose remedies (for
example, divestitures, conduct restriction agreements, and so forth) at any
point during the investigation, although, it is typically at this stage that
remedy negotiation takes place.452
443. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2021).
444. See id. § 2.34(e).
445. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b), (c)(ii).
446. See id. § 16(b).
447. See id. § 16(d).
448. See id. § 16(c).
449. See id. § 16(b), (d).
450. See id. § 16(d).
451. See DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 206, at III-111 to III-119.
452. See Peter Mucchetti, Sharis Pozen, Timothy Cornell, Esther Lee & Julius Pak, Merger Control
in the United States: Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Dec. 1, 2020).
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FTC regulations require the agency to follow a similar process for
obtaining public scrutiny and input on proposed settlements. Promptly after
preliminary approval of the consent order, the FTC must issue a press release
that includes the proposed order, the complaint, and the ACCO.453 At the
same time, the FTC must place on the public record and publish in the
Federal Register an explanation of the provisions of the proposed settlement,
the relief to be obtained thereby, and any other information that it believes
may help interested persons understand the order. This explanation is
commonly known as the “Analysis to Aid Public Comment” and is similar
to the DOJ’s CIS.454 The public is invited to comment on the published
materials (typically published to the FTC website) for thirty days, unless the
FTC shortens or extends the time period.455 Comments are made public on
the FTC website, and although the FTC is not required to respond to
comments, it regularly addresses significant comments in public statements
at the time it makes the consent order final.
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the DOJ, the court
must determine whether the proposed settlement is in the public interest.456
The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing, but may do so.457
The court must weigh a number of factors to determine the competitive
impact of the proposed settlement, including the termination of the alleged
violations, enforcement and modification provisions, duration of settlement,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies considered, if the terms of the
settlement are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations the
court deems necessary to the evaluation of public interest.458 The court must
also consider the impact of the proposed settlement on competition in
relevant markets, the public generally, individuals alleging injury from the
violations, as well as a consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be
derived from the proposed settlement.459 When courts consider these
statutory factors, however, the DOJ is entitled to “broad discretion to settle
with the defendant within the reaches of the public interest.”460 Approval
should be denied only if the decree would make a “mockery of judicial
power.”461 Thus, the court cannot evaluate the best way to resolve the DOJ’s
claims, but rather must only make a determination on whether or not the
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2021).
OECD COMPETITION COMM., supra note 436, at 4–5.
§ 2.34(c).
See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1).
See id. § 16(e)(2).
See id. § 16(e)(1)(A).
See id. § 16(e)(1)(B).
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1462.
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proposed settlement is within the reaches of the public interest. Courts have
also held that subsequent amendments to the Tunney Act did not materially
change this standard.462 Parties to the settlement waive further appeals of the
consent decree. Additionally, because consent decrees are court orders, the
DOJ cannot unilaterally modify or terminate them, and parties wishing to do
so must petition the court. If a consent decree has been violated, the DOJ will
institute an action to enforce the decree in the court that retains jurisdiction
over the case.
The FTC does not require court approval prior to issuing a consent
order. The FTC need only seek approval from the commissioners. In
executing the ACCO, parties waive any right to seek judicial review of the
consent order.463 If a consent order is violated, the FTC has statutory
authority to seek penalties and further injunctive relief from a federal
court.464
4. International Norms
In general, international authorities support the use of settlements in
antitrust cases, as they help “facilitate prompt resolution and help reduce
costs and burdens on parties, agencies, and markets.”465 Additionally, they
endorse the publication of proposed settlements. The OECD notes that
publication of proposed settlements helps address a lack of transparency in
the settlement process, because settlement publications often contain
detailed justifications for the proposed action.466 These detailed justifications
can serve to educate the public about competition law as well as inform
interested third parties about the proposed settlement’s existence and terms.
International authorities provide some support for subjecting proposed
settlements to either third-party or public scrutiny. The ICN’s 2018
Annotated ICN Guidance on Investigative Process report recommends that
enforcement agencies “[c]onsider procedures that allow for consultations
with market participants to seek perspectives on proposed commitments or
remedies, as appropriate and within confidentiality rules.”467
In 2012, the ICN conducted a survey of thirty-six member countries
asking if the respondent’s antitrust regime provided third parties with the
opportunity to comment on proposed remedies or settlement
462.
463.
464.
465.
at 31.
466.
467.

See, e.g., United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2007).
See 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2021).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l).
ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 2; see also OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13,
OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 31.
ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 2.
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commitments.468 The responses on this question were a slight plurality for
“Yes” in mergers (48% Yes, 45% No, 6% Varies), and a plurality and slight
majority for “No” in dominance cases (38% Yes, 50% No, 12% Varies),
cartel cases (32% Yes, 56% No, 12% Varies), and other cases (30% Yes,
57% No, 13% Varies).469 The report concludes that there is no consistent
practice across nations to provide third parties with the opportunity to
comment on proposed remedies, but it did note that many respondents found
it valuable to either market test proposed remedies or seek input from third
parties through either formal or informal channels.470
The same ICN survey asked respondents if the general public is
provided with the opportunity to comment on proposed remedies or
settlement commitments.471 A majority of respondents reported “No” in each
category: mergers (22% Yes, 72% No, 6% Varies), dominance cases (18%
Yes, 76% No, 6% Varies), cartel cases (15% Yes, 82% No, 3% Varies), and
other cases (22% Yes, 74% No, 4% Varies).472 Again, the report concluded
that there is no common practice among the respondents, but that for those
countries which seek public comment, the agency has discretion in
determining how much public comment will weigh in a settlement.473
Ultimately, international authorities tend to focus more on encouraging
antitrust regimes to establish a settlement or consent decree system, or on
ensuring greater transparency and predictability in such a system,474 than on
advocating for third-party or public scrutiny of proposed settlements.
5. Analysis
As noted above, each jurisdiction differs in allowing public scrutiny of
proposed commitments or settlements. As a matter of practice, but not formal
law, Chinese enforcers publish a Decision to Terminate Investigation, which
contains a statement of facts, commitments and their fulfillment, but are not
required to seek public comment. The EU’s commitment system, on which
China’s system was modeled, does permit public scrutiny through market
tests. The EU does not, however, publish submitted observations or publicly
respond to observations. For settlement decisions in the EU, no public
scrutiny is mandated. Neither Chinese nor EU law permits judicial scrutiny
of proposed commitments, although both jurisdictions seem to permit parties
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

ICN TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 3, 26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 19.
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to file an appeal after a commitment has been entered. The United States has
the most developed public scrutiny system for both the DOJ, in the form of
a CIS and invitation for public comment, and the FTC, in the form of an
Analysis to Aid Public Comment and invitation for public comment. The
DOJ is required by the Tunney Act to solicit, publish, and respond to
comments. The FTC solicits comments, but has no formal obligation to
publish or respond to them. Nonetheless, in practice they typically do so
upon issuing the final consent order. U.S. law also requires judicial review
of proposed DOJ consent decrees prior to their issuance but does not require
it for FTC consent decrees. However, the FTC typically subjects its proposed
settlements to public comment. DOJ consent decrees can be appealed but
FTC administrative consent decrees cannot.
Due process would be better served by creating processes that permit
some public scrutiny and judicial review of proposed commitments and
settlements. We are agnostic about whether the public scrutiny takes the form
of the market test process employed by the EU or the notice-and-comment
approach followed in the United States. The important element is to ensure
that any proposed resolution have the benefit of public input.
Subjecting settlements and commitments to courts for approval
provides several benefits. Judicial review ensures that any settlements are in
the public interest. In addition, judicial action enshrines the settlement in a
court order, thereby entitling it to full faith and credit around the world.
I. RIGOROUS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ECONOMIC REASONING
Judicial review of legal decisions after they have been issued is essential
to due process. Only through such independent and external review can a
legal system ensure that the decision is consistent with substantive and
procedural law. This is particularly true for administrative decisionmaking,
in which the same institutional actor serves as investigator, prosecutor, and
adjudicator. Without meaningful judicial review, the agency runs the risk of
exercising unfettered, unilateral discretion.
The institution of judicial review of administrative decisions in China,
established by the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law, is relatively new.475
A party dissatisfied with an administrative decision by MOFCOM in a
merger case must first apply for an administrative reconsideration by the
agency itself.476 If this internal review does not satisfy the parties, they can
475. See He, supra note 20, at 140.
476. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 53; Administrative Reconsideration
Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 Amendment) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
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file an administrative litigation in court.477 In all other cases, the parties have
the right to choose whether to apply for administrative reconsideration first
or to file an administrative litigation in court directly.478 However, in 2014,
China’s newly enacted Administrative Litigation Law expanded judicial
review of agency actions,479 which led to an increase in administrative
litigation.480 During the initial period when there were three enforcement
agencies, the Supreme People’s Court indicated that administrative appeals
would be heard by intellectual property (“IP”) tribunals, which are generally
established at the intermediate appellate level of the Chinese judicial
system.481 Currently, administrative appeals from SAMR decisions will be
heard by the Administrative Tribunal of the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate
Court.482
In the EU, the General Court has unlimited jurisdiction to review
decisions in which the Commission has fixed a fine.483 Under Article 263 of
the TFEU, the General Court typically reviews the legality of the
Commission decision.484 Additionally, it exercises de novo review of the
appropriateness of the fine and has the power to cancel, reduce, or increase
that fine.485 The decision of the General Court may be appealed to the ECJ,
which reviews only the legality of the agency’s decision.486 It does not

People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), art. 7(1).
477. See Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 14; AntiMonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 53.
478. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 53; see also H. STEPHEN HARRIS
JR., PETER J. WANG, YIZHE ZHANG, MARK A. COHEN & SEBASTIEN J. EVRARD, ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 49–50 (2011) (noting that earlier drafts of the Anti-Monopoly Law required
parties to first seek administrative review before judicial review, but that the final draft of the law
eliminated this requirement to provide a more express right to judicial review).
479. Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., promulgated Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), arts. 51, 59, 66, 70, 77,
81, 96.
480. He, supra note 20, at 178 (noting a 55% increase in administrative litigation generally from
2014 to 2015).
481. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Related to the Intellectual Property
Tribunal, Judicial Interpretation No. 22 (2018) (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct.,
Dec. 27, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019) SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., art. 2, http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details
/a7474431cc0e66666117c1edc5dd76.html (China).
482. Wei Yingling & Gong Mingfang, Merger Control in China: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Jan.
1, 2021), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-500-8611?transitionType=Default&contextData
=%28sc.Default%29 [https://perma.cc/XGE3-WZTN?type=image].
483. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 31, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 20.
484. TFEU, supra note 168, art. 263.
485. OECD COMPETITION COMM., THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY COURTS IN COMPETITION
CASES—BACKGROUND NOTE 13 ¶ 33 (May 14, 2019).
486. See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community art. 58, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 180 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (“An appeal
to the Court of Justice shall be limited to points of law.”); see also OECD EU REPORT, supra note 266,
at 42.
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review the facts of the case unless it can be shown that the General Court
“clearly distorted the obvious meaning of the evidence before it.”487
However, in the Intel case, the ECJ reversed the General Court’s decision
for its failure to consider all of the major arguments made by the parties.488
It is worth emphasizing that Intel was a rare setback for DG Comp, which
has rarely lost in court.489
In a U.S. judicial enforcement proceeding, the federal district court
makes the initial decision, and that decision may be appealed to the federal
appellate courts.490 In administrative adjudications before the FTC, the initial
decision of the ALJ is first reviewed de novo by the full Commission without
affording any deference to the ALJ’s factual or legal findings.491 The FTC
settles around 80% of the adjudications it initiates against parties, and these
cases are not subject to judicial review.492 For cases that are not settled, the
Commission’s decision may be appealed to the federal appellate courts.493
Although the judiciary affirmed Commission liability findings in only 50%
of cases from 1987 to 1996, since 2007 and as of 2016 it has affirmed 100%
of appealed administrative cases in which the Commission found liability.494
Judicial review of final decisions is applied in each of the three
jurisdictions. The three jurisdictions differ regarding the depth to which
courts review the economic rationales underlying antitrust enforcement
actions. Chinese law and EU law have historically adopted a deferential
approach. U.S. law expects courts to engage in more searching scrutiny of
the economic rationales on which antitrust decisions are based.495
1. China
It is hard to evaluate this element in current Chinese law because
judicial review of agency decisions has been rare up until this point. Since
Chinese courts can rely on their own factual findings, it is possible that
China’s courts will closely examine economic evidence when relevant cases
arise in the future. Of course, this will depend on the willingness of Chinese
487. See DG COMP ANTITRUST MANUAL, supra note 190, ch. 26.1.2.5.
488. Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶ 147 (Sept. 6, 2017),
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194082&doclang=en.
489. See SCHWEITZER, supra note 28, at 521.
490. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for
Developing the Law or Rubber Stamp?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 623, 632–33 (2016).
491. Id. at 643.
492. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1137, 1172 (2014).
493. See Ohlhausen, supra note 490, at 643.
494. Id. at 626.
495. Maciej Bernatt, Transatlantic Perspective on Judicial Deference in Administrative Law, 22
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275, 323 (2016).
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judges to engage with economic theory. Although some judges in other
jurisdictions have struggled to grapple with complex antitrust economic
rationales because of inexperience,496 Chinese judges can engage with
outside economic experts to help them understand economic issues.
In two recent cases, Beijing Qihu Technology Co. v. Tencent
Technology Company497 and Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Technology & Trade
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson,498 the Chinese judges examined the proposed
economic rationales, suggesting the Chinese judiciary is exploring how to
fully exercise this responsibility.
2. European Union
In the EU, courts have historically been reluctant to second-guess the
economic theories and conclusions advanced by DG Comp and have instead
taken care not to substitute their judgment for that of the Commission in the
decision under review499 by giving agencies a wide “margin of
appreciation.”500 In the case of competition law, this has meant that courts
will not overturn a decision based on its economic reasoning unless the
agency commits a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers.501 In
the 1990s, the General Court employed an economist to help it understand
economic issues.502 Today, while judges may have some knowledge of
competition law, they generally do not have formal economic training,
meaning that litigants must carefully present economic arguments to make
496. See Michal S. Gal, When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust
Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 417, 427–28 (2010) (noting challenges faced by
Jamaica’s judiciary in antitrust cases).
497. Beijing Qihu Keji Youxian Gongsi Su Tengxun Keji (Shenzhen) Youxian Gongsi
(北京奇虎科技有限公司诉腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司) [Beijing Qihu Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Tencent
Tech. (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd.], Mn San Zhong Zi No. 4 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2014) (China).
498. Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Kemao Youxian Gongsi Su Qiangsheng (Shanghai) Yiliao Qicai
Youxian Gongsi, Qiangsheng (Zhongguo) Yiliao Qicai Youxian Gongsi Zongxiang Longduan Xieyi
Jiufen An (北京锐邦涌和科贸有限公司诉强生(上海) 医疗器材有限公司、强生(中国)医疗器材有
限公司纵向垄断协议纠纷案) [Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Tech. & Trade Co., Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson
Med. (Shanghai) Ltd., Johnson & Johnson Med. (China) Ltd.], 2014 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. (Shanghai
Higher People’s Ct. 2013).
499. Case C-441/07 P, Comm’n v. Alrosa Co., ECLI:EU:C:2010:377, ¶ 67 (June 29, 2010), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=84751&doclang=en; SCHWEITZER, supra
note 28, at 504–12; see also Damien Gerard, Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: ReEmpowering the Courts?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 457, 475 (2011).
500. Case C-389/10 P, KME Germany AG v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, ¶ 121 (Dec. 8, 2011),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=116124&doclang=en; see Case C603/13 P, Galp Energía España SA v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2016:38, ¶¶ 71–79 (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173682&doclang=en.
501. KME Germany AG, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, ¶ 121. Other cases use the alterative terminology
of “margin of appraisal” or “margin of assessment.” See id. ¶ 109.
502. SCHWEITZER, supra note 28, at 498.
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them understandable.503
Over time, the EU courts have gradually strengthened judicial scrutiny
of economic considerations. Beginning in 2002, the ECJ has emphasized that
the margin of discretion “does not mean that the Community Courts must
refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an
economic nature.”504 Quite the contrary, courts “cannot use the
Commission’s margin of discretion . . . as a basis for dispensing with the
conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts.”505 This change
appears to stem in part from growing concerns that more searching review is
required to satisfy the ECHR’s standard of fair trials in criminal cases,
defined to apply to any sanction intended to have a punitive and deterrent
effect, including competition law.506 Courts have also recognized that the
need for searching judicial review is particularly strong when the agency
does not provide a clean separation between prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions.507
The General Court’s 2017 decision in United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Commission examined the agency’s economic evidence in the course of
annulling the Commission’s decision to block a merger.508 One set of
commentators identified this case as a turning point, arguing that it
demonstrates that “EU judges are increasingly willing to scrutinise complex
economic appraisals made by the Commission.”509 Future cases should
provide clarity on how strict the EU’s level of scrutiny is.
3. United States
Judicial review of agencies’ economic reasoning is more searching
under U.S. law than under Chinese or EU law. The courts have held that
“[r]easoned decisionmaking can use an economic model to provide useful
information about economic realities” so long as it is supported by
“empirical confirmation of accuracy” or alternatively “a complete analytical
503.
504.

Id. at 498–99.
Case C-12/03 P, Comm’n v. Tetra Laval BV, 2005 E.C.R. I-1047, ¶ 39; see also OECD EU
REPORT, supra note 266, at 59 (describing DG Comp’s “chastisement” in 2002 by the courts, which
apparently “doubt[ed] that the Commission was any more expert than the court about economic matters”).
505. KME Germany AG, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, ¶ 129.
506. A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 43509/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 38–40 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106438.
507. See KME Germany AG, ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, ¶ 68.
508. Case T-194/13, United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2017:144, ¶¶ 201–209 (Mar.
7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188600&doclang=en.
509. James Killick, Katarzyna Czapracka & Mark Powell, Economists Must Respect Due Process
Too! EU General Court Annuls Commission Decision Blocking UPS/TNT Merger, WHITE & CASE LLP
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/economists-must-respect-due-process-tooeu-general-court-annuls-commission [https://perma.cc/7B4X-CH3V] (internal quotation marks omitted).
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defense of [the] model—to respond to each objection with a reasoned
presentation.”510 In particular, courts require agencies to “explain the
assumptions and methodology used in preparing the model” and show “a
rational connection between the factual inputs, modeling assumptions,
modeling results and conclusions drawn from these results” as well as
evidence that the agency is conscious of the limits of the model.511 Courts
will reject economic models that bear “no rational relationship to the reality
it purports to represent”512 or that “generates apparently arbitrary results,
particularly where . . . the agency has failed to justify its choice.”513
4. International Norms
International organizations emphasize the importance of judicial review
of agencies’ economic rationales. For example, the OECD’s Key Points on
Procedural Fairness and Transparency acknowledge that judicial review “is
particularly important when competition agencies are an administrative
body” and typically covers economic assessment as well as an evaluation of
adherence to procedural rules and the factual and legal basis of the
decision.514 The OECD’s Background Note on the Standard of Review
recognizes that courts may grant deference to economic assessments or the
use of economic models “as long as [they] are supported by sufficient
evidence and appropriate analysis (and, depending on the case, discussion
with the parties).”515 The ICC Recommended Framework for International
Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings similarly
recognizes that “[t]he courts, particularly when competition authorities are
an administrative body, play or should play a significant role in safeguarding
due process.”516
5. Analysis
U.S. courts scrutinize agencies’ economic rationales more closely than
Chinese or EU courts, although the Tencent and Johnson & Johnson
decisions in China and the UPS decision in Europe may reflect a greater
interest in more a searching review of economic rationales.
Judicial review is essential for promoting reasoned decisionmaking, due
510. See Am. Pub. Gas Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
511. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
512. Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Columbia Falls Aluminum
Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
513. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
514. OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 13, at 30. The OECD acknowledges that the degree of
deference given the agency varies from country to country. Id. at 31.
515. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, supra note 14, at 18.
516. ICC BEST PRACTICES, supra note 19, at 8.
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process, and transparency. It is worth remembering that judges have played
a critical role in creating U.S. administrative law.517 Judicial review
promotes reasoned decisionmaking and due process.
First, judicial review promotes rational decisions by ensuring a rational
decisionmaking process. While judges are often not experts in substantive
antitrust law, they are experts on procedures and rational deliberative
processes.518 Indeed, judges’ insights from different areas of law may help
them see perspectives that agency officials, occasionally susceptible to
tunnel vision, overlooked.519
Second, judicial review helps protect due process by ensuring that
procedural requirements are met. As China recognized when it amended its
administrative law, agencies were not adequately protecting individual rights
in their proceedings.520 Consequently, the amendment made it easier for
individuals to sue for procedural violations.521 As the Chinese government
recognized, judicial review is a potent tool for ensuring procedural
compliance by agencies.522
Third and more substantively, judicial scrutiny of agencies’ economic
rationales promotes rational decisionmaking and transparency. One of the
central justifications for the burdens of judicial review is that it ensures that
agencies are exercising their expertise as intended.523 Antitrust enforcement
agencies are supposed to concentrate economic expertise to ensure the
nation’s economic laws are obeyed. To properly scrutinize and check agency
reasoning—a necessary prerequisite to the benefits of judicial review—
judges must be willing to examine and critically evaluate agencies’
economic analyses, if only to counter the cognitive tendency of agency
experts to be overconfident.524 Of course, a properly balanced system of
judicial review does not normally let judges displace agency rationales as
agency officials, not judges, are the experts. One additional incidental benefit
of judicial review is that judicial scrutiny and explication of agency
economic theories may promote transparency. Judges will undoubtedly

517. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1295 (2012); Pierce, supra note 220, at 65.
518. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Cir. Judge, U.S. Ct. Appeals for the Seventh Cir., Generalist Judges
in a Specialized World, Speech Before the SMU School of Law at the Eighth Annual Judge Irving L.
Goldberg Lecture (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1775, 1768 (1997).
519. See, e.g., id. at 1767–68 (discussing the insights generalist judges can provide into specialized
issues).
520. See He, supra note 20, at 172.
521. See id.
522. See id.
523. See supra notes 510–511 and accompanying text.
524. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 74, at 559–61, 579–80, 588–90.
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attempt to translate complex economic theories into language they can
understand. By putting such explications in judicial opinions, regulated
parties will better understand what the agency expects of them, helping them
comply in the future. Further, judicial review guards against cognitive biases,
such as over-identification.525
China has demonstrated its commitment to strengthening its system of
judicial review. Before the recent reforms, administrative litigation in
general had been difficult in China for several reasons. First, it was difficult
to initiate lawsuits, with one survey estimating that around 43% or more of
attempted suits were not heard by the court in the end.526 Second, as to cases
for which administrative suits did proceed, judgments were not made since
the suits were withdrawn by the plaintiffs, which accounts for an estimated
thirty to 57% of cases.527 Third, successful plaintiffs sometimes encountered
difficulty seeing judgments enforced.528
However, in November 2014, China passed an amendment to the
Administrative Litigation Law to combat these issues.529 First, the
amendment emphasizes the right of citizens to file complaints and provides
an opportunity to appeal if a court declines to accept a complaint.530 Second,
the law creates sanctions for agencies that improperly coerce a plaintiff to
drop a case and gives judges greater power to nullify agency actions.531
Third, the law imposes monetary sanctions on agency leaders and staff that
refuse to honor a court judgment.532 The evidence suggests that the reforms
have been at least partially successful: from 2014 to 2015, the number of
administrative cases filed during the year increased by 55% to around
220,000.533 For now, there is not enough administrative litigation concerning
antitrust issues to support a general evaluation. However, although it remains
to be seen whether this law will create an increase in judicial review of
antitrust enforcement agency actions in China, the initial numbers in
administrative litigation are promising.

525. See id. (discussing how feedback given in judicial review can counter the cognitive tendency
of agency experts to be overconfident).
526. He, supra note 20, at 143.
527. Id. at 145.
528. Id. at 147–48.
529. Id. at 162.
530. Id. at 163–64.
531. Id. at 164.
532. Id. at 166.
533. Id. at 178.
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All three jurisdictions permit de novo judicial review of interpretations
of law and provide for substantial review of factual findings as well. There
is one area in which the practice with respect to judicial review varies across
the jurisdiction. Whereas U.S. courts subject economic reasoning to hard
look review, EU courts have given the Commission a wider margin of
discretion with respect to economic reasoning, overturning decisions on that
basis only for manifest errors of assessment. However, in recent years—the
Intel decision being a landmark decision534—the level of deference given to
the agency has been reduced by the Court.535 This is especially important,
since a too deferential judicial review of economic reasoning renders the
combination of investigative or prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions
problematic.
CONCLUSION
As global markets integrate and national economies develop, antitrust
law is an essential part of a modern legal system. Thus, countries around the
world are empowering government agencies to enforce antitrust laws.
Although agencies are powerful instruments, they also threaten due process,
transparency, and even rational decisionmaking, the main advantage of their
existence. Imposing procedural restraints on enforcement agencies can help
countries reap the benefits of antitrust laws without incurring the social costs
that unrestrained agencies impose.
This Article identifies nine procedural requirements that would promote
rational, fair, and transparent agency decisionmaking. The tenth anniversary
of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law provided the impetus for this Article. As
China’s economy makes up an increasingly large share of the global
economy, much depends on the health of China’s antitrust enforcement
system. In comparing China’s procedures to those of the United States and
EU, both of which have much older antitrust enforcement systems, it was
inevitable that China’s procedures would be relatively less developed. Yet
this investigation revealed substantial problems with the EU’s enforcement
regime, and even some room for improvement in the world’s oldest system,
that of the United States. While China’s enforcement system has room for
growth, this Article acknowledges that China has made incredible progress
in the ten years since it promulgated the Anti-Monopoly Law. All three
jurisdictions have room for improvement in pursuing rational, fair, and
534. Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 90–102 (Sept. 6, 2017),
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194082&doclang=en.
535. See generally Case C-122/16 P, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:861 (Nov.
14, 2017), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=196627&doclang=en. For
a merger case, see generally C-265/17 P, United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2019:23,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209848&doclang=en.
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transparent antitrust enforcement regimes. The procedures proposed in this
Article can help bolster all three jurisdictions’ systems. If China, the EU, and
the United States can strike the right balance, the global economy will have
much to celebrate in the coming years.

